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INTRODUCTION
American products liability law has been evolving for more than a
hundred years, primarily in the direction of expanding plaintiffs' rights to
recover. Only recently-in the past decade or so-has this expansionary
tendency slowed and, here and there, stopped dead in its tracks. State
legislatures have played an important role in slowing expansion.' And
largely independent of the statutory reforms it now appears that courts
also have moved toward limiting recovery rights.2 These recent develop-
ments commonly are explained in political terms.3 At last, and not sur-
prisingly, the recent trend toward political conservatism has caught up
with liability law; an earlier, almost euphoric faith in a limitless Ameri-
can economy has given way to the realization that financial resources are,
after all, finite.4 As evidence, advocates of the view that tort has gone too
far point to growing numbers of manufacturers who are unable to sustain
the significant financial burdens imposed by vigorous judicial review of
product decisions reached in the marketplace.5
In contrast, this Article offers a very different explanation for why
the expansion of American products liability law is coming to an end. In
our view, American products liability law has reached a point from
which further meaningful development is not only socially undesirable
but also institutionally unworkable. From the turn of the last century,
significant expansions of products liability law have included eliminating
the privity requirement in negligence actions,6 replacing negligence and
implied warranty with strict liability in tort,7 and applying products lia-
bility not only to production defects but also to defective product designs
and product marketing." Eliminating the requirement that plaintiffs
I See Litan & Winston, Policy Options, in Liability: Perspectives and Policy 223, 229-33
(R. Litan & C. Winston eds. 1988) (describing state tort reform measures).
2 See Henderson & Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical
Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 479, 498-533 (1990) (indicating that courts disfa-
vored tort expansion independent of whether legislatures adopted reform). But see Schuck,
Introduction: The Context of Controversy, in Tort Law and the Public Interest 17, 29-31 (P.
Schuck ed. 1991) (casting doubt on Henderson & Eisenberg's methodology and predicting end
to any prodefendant trend).
3 See, e.g., Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modem Ameri-
can Tort Law, - Ga. L. Rev. - (1992) (forthcoming).
4 For a description of the earlier expansionary vision, see Priest, The Invention of Enter-
prise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modem Tort Law, 14 J.
Legal Stud. 461, 505-18 (1985).
S See generally P. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences 14-15,
56-57, 155-56 (1988).
6 See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053
(1916).
7 See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62-63, 377 P.2d 897,
900-01, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700-01 (1963).
8 See, e.g., Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 807, 395 A.2d 843, 846
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prove product defectiveness as a prerequisite to recovery would seem to
be the next logical step on this path.9 Indeed, a number of writers in
recent years have advocated various forms of liability without defect,10
even while expressing doubts regarding its efficacy." Moreover, a few
courts actually have adopted limited versions of liability without defect. 12
Notwithstanding these developments, this Article takes the position
that liability without defect never will become part of the products liabil-
ity mainstream. Our pessimism stems not from the fact that liability
without defect is politically unacceptable, since political opinion eventu-
ally could shift once again to favor plaintiffs. Rather, we demonstrate
that defect is the conceptual linchpin that holds products liability law
together; a system of liability without defect is beyond the capacity of
courts to implement.
Part I of this Article divides American products liability law into
four time periods and surveys the major developments of each period.
(1978).
9 Imposing liability without defect traces its intellectual roots to the beginnings of the
strict products liability movement. For example, John Wade, an early and influential com-
mentator, offered a test for defect which anticipated the liability-without-defect movement.
See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-40
(1973) (enumerating seven factors to be weighed in determining whether product is unreasona-
bly dangerous). See generally Priest, supra note 4, at 505-18 (emphasizing risk sharing rather
than traditional tort law risk bearing).
10 See, e.g., Croley & Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alternative Explanation for Re-
cent Events in Products Liability, 8 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 8 (1991) ("courts should complete the
shift toward enterprise liability"); Diamond, Eliminating the "Defect" in Design Strict Prod-
ucts Liability Theory, 34 Hastings L.J. 529, 531 (1983) (urging application of traditional strict
liability-liability not premised on defect-to products associated with abnormally dangerous
activities and suggesting that "[i]t is arguable that traditional strict liability also should be
extended to products not associated with abnormally dangerous activities"); Edell, Risk Utility
Analysis of Unavoidably Unsafe Products, 17 Seton Hall L. Rev. 623, 641 (1987) (arguing that
product whose risk outweighs its utility should be "deemed to be so dangerous and of such
little value to society that it should not be marketed at all"). But see Twerski, A Moderate and
Restrained Federal Product Liability Bill: Targeting the Crisis Areas for Resolution, 18 U.
Mich. J.L. Ref. 575, 588-89 (1985) (criticizing imposition of design-defect liability where no
safer alternative design exists); Note, Strict Products Liability and the Risk-Utility Test for
Design Defect: An Economic Analysis, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 2045, 2061 (1984) (arguing that
design-defect liability, where no alternative is available, will result in net loss of social utility).
I1 See, e.g., Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 Cal. L. Rev. 435,
442 (1979) (noting that "genuine strict liability" merits "serious attention," even though gener-
ally regarded as extreme).
12 See, e.g., Haphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 115-17 (La. 1986)
(asbestos manufacturer held liable even though did not and could not have known of product's
danger); Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 304 Md. 124, 144-57, 497 A.2d 1143, 1153-59 (1985) (innocent
victim of criminal assault has cause of action against manufacturer of "Saturday Night Spe-
cial" handguns); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 184-85, 463 A.2d 298, 306 (1983)
(aboveground swimming pool manufacturer held liable on risk-utility grounds despite absence
of alternative design). In each jurisdiction, these decisions have been overturned by statute.
See note 195 and accompanying text infra.
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Conceiving the final period-the present-as one of retrenchment, this
Part proposes that the expansive trend ceased not only because observers
widely intuited that tort had gone too far, a hypothesis that this Article
does not test, but more fundamentally because its next logical step is
institutionally impossible. To highlight why this Article's focus on liabil-
ity without defect is far from trivial, notwithstanding the force of our
previous assertion of unworkability, section B of Part I examines several
compelling justifications in favor of the no-defect liability expansion.
These justifications provide a counterweight against which this Article's
criticisms of liability without defect may be balanced and, in the final
analysis, judged.
In light of this background, Part II examines in detail the viability of
an "across-the-board" system of liability without defect and argues that
courts would find such a sytem impossible to implement for three rea-
sons. First, abandoning the defect requirement would create insur-
mountable problems in handling the already difficult questions of
causation. Second, complex issues concerning the responsibilities of
users and consumers for contributing to accidental injuries would have to
be rethought and reworked. And third, excusing proof of original defect
would burden product manufacturers with indefinite liability, even after
their products' useful lives had expired. Even assuming that courts
somehow could rise above these problems of institutional capacity, we
argue that a no-defect liability system would cause such serious distor-
tion effects on the behavior of firms and individuals in the marketplace
that its adoption would be unwise in the extreme.
Part III focuses upon the possibility of imposing liability without
defect on specific categories of notoriously dangerous products, such as
handguns, cigarettes, or alcohol. This system would select the product
categories to be covered either by a risk-utility analysis or by other crite-
ria: for example, that a product is far too costly irrespective of its utility.
After examining various practical and theoretical difficulties with a prod-
uct-category system, Part III argues that, like across-the-board liability,
this alternative is so riddled with problems that it too is beyond judicial
capacity to implement fairly and well. Therefore, this Article concludes
that, whatever might be said pro or con regarding a legislatively con-
ceived system of no-fault compensation as a replacement for tort alto-
gether, 13 tort as a common-law system of regulating product safety has
13 For a discussion of nonjudicial alternatives, see Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits
of Tort Law and Government Regulation, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 1281, 1291-1331 (1980) (propos-
ing creation of new federal agency to regulate safety); text accompanying notes 37-51 infra
(describing arguments in favor of no-defect system of liability). For a treatment of the
problems of implementation, see generally Henderson, The Boundary Problems of Enterprise
Liability, 41 Md. L. Rev. 659 (1982). For a discussion and criticism of New Zealand's ground-
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reached its inherent institutional limits.
If one analogizes the historical development of products liability to
the westward migration of European settlers across the North American
continent, products liability has reached the shores of its Pacific Ocean.
We now can turn our attention inland to improve settled territories.
From here, however, no further continental landmass remains to be dis-
covered and occupied. Anyone who believes otherwise is in for a very
long swim.
I
THE AMERICAN PRODUCTS LIABILITY FRONTIER
A. Major Stages in the Historical Evolution of American Products
Liability Law
This section divides the historical evolution of American products
liability doctrine into four time periods, beginning in 1850 and ending in
the present. Although these divisions are somewhat artificial, the time
periods capture four distinct phases in the development of American
products liability doctrine.
1. Prodefendant Biases During the Industrial Revolution (1850-1900)
The first period of development corresponds roughly to the onset of
the Industrial Revolution in this country. Prior to 1850, mass-produced
products did not exist in sufficient quantities to support a system of tort
liability concerned primarily with the risks of product use and consump-
tion. However, this situation changed in the period following the Civil
War when American industries grew rapidly and the consumption of
mass-produced goods and services became commonplace. 14 The law of
products liability was markedly antiplaintiff during this early period,
epitomized by the privity rule which effectively barred plaintiffs from re-
covering against negligent manufacturers.1 5 Indeed, so prodefendant
were the rules relating to liability that a prominent legal historian ob-
served that products liability hardly existed prior to 1900.16
2. The Development of Strict Tort Liability for Production Defects
(1900-1960)
If the liability developments in the first period of evolution were
breaking Accident Compensation Act of 1972, see generally Henderson, The New Zealand
Accident Compensation Reform, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 781 (1981).14 See L. Friedman, A History of American Law 467-87 (2d ed. 1985).
15 See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of
Torts 679-81 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter Prosser & Keeton on Torts].
16 See L. Friedman, supra note 14, at 684.
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markedly prodefendant, the developments in the second were more
strongly proplaintiff. One important change early in the second period
was the elimination of the privity requirement in negligence cases. 17
Thereafter, sometimes by small increments but always steadily-one
might even say, relentlessly-courts used both tort and contract princi-
ples to impose strict liability 'on the commercial distributors of defective
products. In tort, courts expanded the traditional doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur to the point where the mere fact of a product defect supported
an inference of negligence. 18 In contract, courts dismantled the tradi-
tional impediments to plaintiffs' actions for breach of warranty.1 9
The second period ended in 1960 with the epochal decision in Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. ,20 stripping warranty completely of its
contractual limitations and imposing strict liability in tort. Although it
took several more years before privity-free strict liability in tort was rec-
ognized widely,21 the Henningsen decision clearly signaled a more hospi-
table environment for plaintiffs.
3. Extending Products Liability to Defective Design
and Failure-to-Warn (1960-1980)
Common-law developments in this period, as in the second, were
substantially proplaintiff. From 1960 to 1980, courts extended and clari-
fied the strict liability standard announced in Henningsen.22 More signif-
icantly, courts developed a second major front in the products liability
war-they focused attention on, and imposed liability for, generic prod-
uct hazards-that is, for hazards that inhered in the design and market-
ing of products rather than in their production.23 The same courts that
had focused primarily on cases involving production defects24 began dis-
mantling the traditional doctrinal impediments to recovery for generic
17 See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053
(1916); see also Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
Yale L.J. 1099, 1100-02 (1960) (noting erosion of privity requirement).
18 See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 459-60, 150 P.2d 436, 438-39
(1944); see also Prosser, supra note 17, at 1114-20 (noting use of res ipsa loquitur by courts to
allow inference of negligence from presence of defective product).
19 See Prosser, supra note 17, at 1106, 1117-19.
20 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
21 See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62-63, 377 P.2d 897,
900-01, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700-01 (1963); see also Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791 (1966) (tracing fall of privity doctrine and
evolution of strict products liability).
22 See generally Priest, supra note 4, at 505-19.
23 See Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The
Limits of Adjudication, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1531, 1542-44 (1973).
24 See id. at 1544-46.
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product hazards. 25 Decisions published during the late 1970s and early
1980s represent what many observers consider to be the high water
marks of this expansionary, remarkably proplaintiff period. 26 By 1980,
American courts had put in place a liability regime that hardly existed in
1960: a robust, expanding system of tort liability for defective product
designs and failures to warn of product hazards.2 7
4. Retrenchment and Judicial Flirtation with Liability Without Defect
(1980 to the Present)
The first prodefendant period in the modem era of products liability
law began in the early 1980s. With increasing frequency, judicial opin-
ions suggested that developments in the third period had gone too far.28
25 These doctrinal barriers included the patent-danger doctrine, shifting duty, the in-
tended-purpose doctrine, and the bystander rule. For a discussion of the barriers, referred to
as "single factor no-duty rules," see Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and
Standards in Design Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of
Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 521, 523-24 & nn.7-10 (1982). The first major decision imposing
liability for obvious design hazards was Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 475-76,
467 P.2d 229, 235, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629, 635 (1970). The leading case denying liability, Campo v.
Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950), was overruled in Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39
N.Y.2d 376, 376-80, 348 N.E.2d 571, 571-75, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 115-19 (1976).
In the same period, courts focused on issues tangential to the concepts of defective design
and marketing, such as whether plaintiffs injured by a generically hazardous product should be
allowed to recover when they cannot prove which of several producers manufactured the prod-
uct unit(s) that caused injury, see, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612-14,
607 P.2d 924, 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144-46, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980), or
whether plaintiffs guilty of misusing products nevertheless should be able to recover for bad
product designs. See, e.g., Hughes v. Magic Chef, Inc., 288 N.W.2d 542, 544-47 (Iowa 1980)
(plaintiff's alleged misuse of stove not affirmative defense, but plaintiff still must prove product
defect caused explosion and injury).
26 See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432-33, 573 P.2d 443, 455-56, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225, 237-38 (1978) (alternative tests for defective design: consumer expectations
and risk-utility balancing with burden of proof shifted to defendant); Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 204-08, 447 A.2d 539, 546-49 (1982) (manufacturers of
asbestos liable for product-related hazards that were scientifically unknowable at time of origi-
nal distribution).
27 See generally Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product De-
sign: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 Minn. L. Rev. 773 (1979).
28 See, e.g., Chaulk by Murphy v. Volkswagen of Am., 808 F.2d 639, 645 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Posner, J., dissenting) ("Ours is not a system of people's justice where six laymen are allowed
to condemn an entire industry on the basis of absurd testimony by a professional witness.");
Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 963 (3d Cir. 1980) ("Although it is important that
society devise a proper system for compensating those injured in automobile collisions, it is not
at all clear that the present arrangement of permitting individual juries, under varying stan-
dards of liability, to impose this obligation on manufacturers is fair or efficient."), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 959 (1981); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 67, 577 P.2d 1322, 1326
(1978) ("If liability for alleged design defects is to 'stop somewhere short of the freakish and
the fantastic,' 'plaintiffs' prima facie case of a defect must show more than the technical possi-
bility of a safer design." (quoting Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 27 (1953)));
Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Div., 515 Pa. 334, 346, 528 A.2d 590, 595 (1987) (Hutchison, J., dis-
senting) ("I am compelled, in the words of a popular song, to 'speak out against the madness.'
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Many state legislatures also expressed disapproval of products liability
law by passing tort reform measures. 29 By the beginning of the 1990s,
courts were favoring defendants distinctly more frequently than plaintiffs
in cases of first impression in products liability decisions.30 Courts did
not invariably overturn prior decisions, although some backsliding did
occur.31 Instead, courts simply rejected plaintiffs' arguments favoring
further expansions of the products liability boundaries. 32
These judicial refusals have occurred at both the micro and the
macro levels. At the micro level, courts frequently have declined to ap-
ply established doctrine to new facts and circumstances. They have re-
fused, for example, to extend strict tort liability to commercial suppliers
of what are deemed services rather than products.33 Similarly, they have
rejected a per se rule imposing vicarious liability on successor corpora-
tions merely because predecessor firms had distributed defective prod-
ucts.34 At the macro level, courts overwhelmingly have rejected
entreaties to abandon the requirement that plaintiffs show the injury-
causing product to have been, in some way or other, defective.35 Thus,
The instant madness is a creeping consensus among us judges and lawyers that we are more
capable of designing products than engineers. A courtroom is a poor substitute for a design
office.").
29 See note 1 supra.
30 See note 2 supra.
31 See, e.g., Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 311 (in extended
analysis, speaking explicitly of "retreating" from generous approach to plaintiff's epidemiolog-
ical proof in Bendeetin cases), modified on reh'g, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1511 (1990); Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 452-55, 479 A.2d 374,
386-88 (1984) (limiting to its facts holding in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J.
191, 204-08, 447 A.2d 539, 546-49 (1982), that manufacturer is liable for product-related risks
scientifically unknowable at time of distribution).
32 In recent'years, for example, no fewer than six of the highest state courts have rejected
the "product line" exception to traditional no-liability rules for successor corporations. See
Bullington v. Union Tool Corp., 254 Ga. 283, 285, 328 S.E.2d 726, 728 (1985); DeLapp v.
Xtraman, Inc., 417 N.W.2d 219, 222 (Iowa 1987); Simoneau v. South Bend Lathe, Inc., 130
N.H. 466,469-70, 543 A.2d 407, 409 (1988); Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co., 30 Ohio
St. 3d 60, 66-67, 507 N.E.2d 331, 336-37 (1987); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach., Inc., 387
N.W.2d 515, 519-21 (S.D. 1986); Fish v. Amsted Indus., 126 Wis. 2d 293, 309-10, 376 N.W.2d
820, 828 (1985).
33 See, e.g., Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Trane Co., 831 F.2d 153, 156 (7th Cir. 1987) (non-
manufacturer product designer not strictly liable).
34 See Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96, 99-100 nn.1-2 (Minn. 1989) (in pe-
riod 1983-1989, 18 out of 21 courts to consider successor liability rejected more generous
approach).
35 See cases cited in note 159 infra. But see cases cited in note 12 supra. One exceptional
decision was O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983), discussed at length
in notes 197-202 and accompanying text infra. A vigorous dissenter was moved to observe,
"Absolute liability is imposed where, on the basis of policy considerations including risk-
spreading, it is determined that a manufacturer or other seller should bear the cost of injuries
• ..regardless of the presence or absence of any defect." Id. at 200, 463 A.2d at 314-15
(Schreiber, J., concurring and dissenting).
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while products liability law has moved far in providing relief to plaintiffs,
courts have refused to adopt a standard of absolute liability for manufac-
turers and distributors of certain broadly defined categories of prod-
ucts. 36 This possibility, to which we apply the term "liability without
defect," provides the focus for the remainder of this Article.
B. Theoretical Justifications for Imposing Liability Without Defect
If a system of liability without defect is as impossible to implement
as we assert, the next logical question is why such a system deserves scru-
tiny. First, practical issues compel this attention: plaintiffs repeatedly
have advanced the notion of liability without defect, and a few courts
have flirted with the idea.37 Second, liability without defect has been part
of the agenda of liability commentators espousing expansionary trends
from the outset of our modem products liability system.38 Finally, as-
suming that a system of defect-free strict liability for product-related
hazards somehow could be implemented, 39 strong social utility and fair-
ness arguments can be made to justify such a system.4°
From the standpoint of enhancing social utility, strict, defect-free
liability would help to achieve three objectives. First, defect-free prod-
ucts liability would reduce the consumption of relatively risky products
by increasing their monetary costs to users and consumers, thereby plac-
ing such products at a competitive disadvantage in the market.41 Be-
36 See, e.g., Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1268-69 (5th Cir. 1985) (marketing of
handguns not ultrahazardous activity); Maguire v. Pabst Brewing Co., 387 N.W.2d 565, 570
(Iowa 1986) (beer not unreasonably dangerous product).
37 See, e.g., Halphen v. Johns-Mansville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 113 (La. 1986);
Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 304 Md. 124, 132-33, 497 A.2d 1143, 1146 (1985); O'Brien, 94 N.J. at
184-85, 463 A.2d at 306.
38 See generally Priest, supra note 4, at 505-19.
39 See text accompanying notes 65-86 infra (discussing problems of implementation). Note
that we are assuming that courts determine causation based on the defendant's knowledge at
the time of original distribution. As commentators have observed, the retroactive imposition
of liability based on new (time-of-trial) knowledge is inefficient. See Danzon, Tort Reform and
the Role of Government in Private Insurance Markets, 13 J. Legal Stud. 517, 534-43 (1984);
Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structures and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and
the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. Legal Stud. 689, 692-705 (1984). Reconstructing what
was knowable at the time of original distribution, of course, would present serious problems of
implementation.
40 Various commentators have explored the advantages of adopting strict liability rather
than a fault-based approach in the context of liability for production defects. See, e.g., Cowan,
Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 1077, 1087-92 (1965); Henderson,
Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 Cal. L. Rev. 919, 931-39 (1982);
Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 681, 703-07
(1980). Imposing liability without defect for generic product hazards would generate many of
the same advantages.
41 This phoenomenon is often referred to as "market deterrence." See generally G. Cala-
bresi, The Cost of Accidents 26-27 (1970) (describing in detail relationship between risk and
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cause users and consumers are thought to underestimate the potential
dangers caused by hazardous products, overconsumption is likely unless
product prices reflect manufacturers' liability insurance costs.42 The cur-
rent products liability system, which requires that a defect be established
as a predicate for liability, allows many products that create substantial
but unavoidable hazards to escape liability.4 3 Such products, therefore,
appear on the market without reflecting their true costs to society.
Under a defect-free strict liability rule, the full costs of product-related
injuries would be reflected in the purchase prices of products, leading to
more appropriate levels of consumption.
Second, a system for all product-related injuries would promote
more appropriate levels of investment in product safety. Theoretically,
the current fault-based theories of liability for generic, design-related
product hazards encourage manufacturers to invest optimally in product
safety.44 However, establishing the defectiveness of product designs or
modes of marketing is no easy matter.4 5 Fully aware of plaintiff's
problems of proof, manufacturers may be willing to take their chances on
escaping liability under our current system. Presumably, under a regime
of defect-free strict liability manufacturers would be more likely to be
found liable and therefore would be more likely to invest in the optimum
level of safety.46
Third, defect-free strict liability might help to reduce certain dislo-
cation costs that occur when individual victims are required to bear the
full brunt of their accident losses.47 Under a fault- or defect-based sys-
tem, in the vast majority of instances in which the manufacturer corn-
consumption and concluding that only when acts are forbidden or consumers face greater
initial costs will optimal consumption levels result); J. O'Connell, Ending Insult to Injury 76-
80 (1975) (stating that if liability is imposed prices will rise, consumption will fall, and optimal
consumption will result).
42 See National Comm'n on Prod. Safety, Final Report 63 (1970) ("It is difficult to under-
estimate the knowledge of most consumers about product safety."); Henderson, supra note 40,
at 933 (noting that strict liability has been justified as means to compensate for consumers'
underassessment of product risks).
43 See note 62 infra.
44 See Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. Legal Stud. 205, 206-09 (1973) (rational
producer will respond to threat of liability for negligence by investing in accident avoidance
until marginal costs of avoidance equal marginal costs of accidents).
45 See Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Product Liability Law-A Rush to
Judgment, 28 Drake L. Rev. 221, 227-28 (1978-79) (action sounding in negligence presents
plaintiff with formidable issues of proof, such as what manufacturer with expertise in particu-
lar field should have known).
46 See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 443-44 ("[A] genuine strict liability rule would create
significant safety incentives.").
47 See G. Calabresi, supra note 41, at 39 ("[T]aking a large sum of money from one person
is more likely to result in economic dislocation, and therefore in secondary and avoidable
losses, than taking a series of small sums from many people.").
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plies with the liability standard, losses fall on the injured victims. When
the injuries are serious, these losses can be crushing. By shifting the costs
of product-related injuries onto manufacturers, and then by using insur-
ance which adds the cost of the premium to the price of the product and
thus spreads the risk among consumers,48 liability without defect could
alleviate the serious dislocation costs generated by injuries suffered from
nondefective but often highly dangerous products.
In addition to fostering the three social-utility goals described above,
strict products liability without defect arguably would give expression to
at least two fundamental fairness norms. First, victims of injuries caused
by hidden production defects legitimately argue that their reasonable ex-
pectations for product performance have been disappointed. 49 One
might argue persuasively that defect-free liability for generic product
hazards would address, in a parallel fashion, situations in which consum-
ers have paid value for products that, despite meeting risk-utility norms,
have turned on them. According to this view, a regime of defect-free
liability based upon product-related injury would better satisfy consumer
expectations than would the defect-related theories that currently gov-
ern, and drastically limit, liability for generic product risks.
Second, assessing liability against a manufacturer for all product-
related injuries in many instances would shift the costs of such accidents
from those who do not benefit directly from the product-bystander vie-
tis, for example-to those who do benefit directly-product users and
consumers. 50 A pedestrian injured by an automobile may argue, with
justification, that those who benefit directly from automobiles should
48 See Cushing v. Rodman, 82 F.2d 864, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (businesses spread burden of
strict liability in implied warranty by increasing prices); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24
Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) ("The cost of an injury
and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured ....
[T]he risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a
cost of doing business.").
49 See generally Hubbard, Efficiency, Expectations and Justice: A Jurisprudential Analysis
of the Concept of the Unreasonably Dangerous Product Defect, 28 S.C.L. Rev. 587 (1977)
(discussing use of "reasonable man" test in evaluating unreasonably dangerous product de-
fects); Hubbard, Reasonable Human Expectations: A Normative Model for Imposing Strict
Liability for Defective Products, 29 Mercer L. Rev. 465 (1978) [hereinafter Hubbard, Reason-
able Human Expectations] (advocating imposing truly "human" expectations upon manufac-
turers in tort cases); Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine,
Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 Va. L. Rev. 1109 (1974) (dis-
cussing use of consumer expectations in products liability suits).
50 The Supreme Court of Illinois has articulated this fairness rationale from a "consumer v.
manufacturer" perspective. See Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 619, 210 N.E.2d
182, 186 (1965) (asserting that manufacturer should be strictly liable since it profits from its
activity). One writer has articulated this same fairness rationale from the "consumer v. con-
sumer" perspective. See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 537,
542 (1972) (identifying injury resulting from nonreciprocal risk as paradigmatic case for im-
posing strict liability).
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bear the costs of automobile accidents.5 1
While all of these justifications compel serious attention to a non-
defect-based theory of recovery for tort victims, the arguments ultimately
fail. As the remainder of this Article demonstrates, a system of liability
without defect not only would encourage problematical behavior on the
part of manufacturers and consumers, but also would pose insurmounta-
ble implementation problems. Part II examines these assertions with re-
spect to across-the-board liability; Part III focuses on limited product
categories.
ACROSS-THE-BOARD 52 LIABILITY WITHOUT DEFECT
This Part considers the implications of holding distributors of all
products strictly liable for the harms their products cause. After provid-
ing a more detailed blueprint for a system of across-the-board liability in
section A, section B analyzes whether courts could implement liability
without defect and concludes that they could not. In section C, a look at
the likely market effects of such liability reveals that, quite aside from
problems of implementation, adopting such a system would be unwise.
Finally, section D describes the extent to which courts and legislatures to
date have moved in the direction of across-the-board liability without
defect.
A. A Closer Look at What Such a System Would Be Like
A system of across-the-board liability without defect would recog-
nize causes of action for physical injuries53 caused by all commercially
distributed 54 products, 55 whether or not courts would consider such
51 Even if the pedestrian owns an automobile, at the time of the accident she was not
benefitting directly from that product. The underlying point runs even deeper. Assuming the
plaintiff is injured while riding in her own automobile, she is still in a subclass of "auto user/
victims" as opposed to "auto users," and arguably has a fairness-based claim for compensa-
tion. For a treatment of this point in the context of allergic-reaction injuries, see Henderson,
Process Norms in Products Litigation: Liability for Allergic Reactions, 51 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
761, 787 (1990).
52 The phrase "across-the-board" is synonymous with "across-all-products."
53 Courts, mindful of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965), which suggests
that liability be limited to personal injury and property damage, are reluctant to permit recov-
ery for intangibles such as emotional harm and pure economic loss. See, e.g., Barber Lines A/
S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 51 (1st Cir. 1985) (denying recovery for purely conse-
quential economic loss); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 617-19, 249 N.E.2d 419, 423-24,
301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 560-61 (1969) (rejecting rule that expanded liability for emotional harm).
54 Again, mindful of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965), which suggests that
liability be limited to commercial distributors of products, modern courts are reluctant to im-
pose strict liability on noncommercial distributors. The set of noncommercial distributors that
escape strict liability includes sellers engaged in "casual sales," i.e., sellers "not in the busi-
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products defective under traditional products liability doctrines. Causa-
tion alone, rather than the traditional combination of causation and de-
fectiveness, would constitute the plaintiff's prima facie case. Liability for
all types of product hazards would be strict. Current law imposes strict
liability for harm caused by production defects.5 6 However, as informed
observers understand full well, our courts have never extended true strict
liability-liability without any judgment of unreasonableness or fault-
very far beyond production defects.57 Although judges have talked re-
peatedly of imposing "strict liability" for defective product designs and
failures to warn,5 8 in reality they have retained a primarily fault-based
approach to generic product hazards.59 By abandoning the requirement
that plaintiffs show defective modes of design and marketing, courts, for
the first time, would impose true strict liability for all product hazards
including, most significantly, generic hazards. 60
As the next section makes clear, moving to across-the-board liability
without defect would present courts with serious problems of implemen-
tation. But the basic idea of liability without defect is straightforwardly
simple. For the first time, product distributors would be required to pay
for the costs of all accidents caused by their products.61 As opposed to
ness" of distributing the particular product that caused injury. See, e.g., Lemley v. J & B Tire
Co., 426 F. Supp. 1376, 1377 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (sellers of used automobiles who are not dealers
not held strictly liable); Stapinski v. Walsh Constr. Co., 383 N.E.2d 473, 475 (Ind. App. 1978)
(same), vacated on other grounds, 272 Ind. 6, 395 N.E.2d 1251 (1979).
55 Courts traditionally have distinguished between commercial distributors of "products"
and "services," imposing strict liability only on the former. See note 33 supra.
56 See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 61, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963).
57 See, e.g., Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 421 Mich. 670, 687-88, 365 N.W.2d 176, 184 (1984)
("Although many courts have insisted that the risk-utility tests they are applying are not negli-
gence tests because their focus is on the product rather than the manufacturer's conduct, the
distinction... appears to be nothing more than semantic.... The underlying negligence
calculus is inescapable." (citation omitted)). See generally Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for
Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 Vand. L.
Rev. 593, 643-46 (1980) (casting doubt on incentive to safety argument for strict liability);
Henderson, supra note 27, at 733-81 (noting use of cost-benefit analysis in majority of courts).
58 See, e.g., Schuldies v. Service Mach. Co., 448 F. Supp. 1196, 1199-1200 (E.D. Wis.
1978) (supporting no-defect liability where product defectively designed); Barker v. Lull Eng'g
Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 236 (1978) (supporting no-
defect liability if product does not perform up .to consumer expectations or fails to pass risk-
utility test); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 126, 501 P.2d 1153, 1157, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 437 (1972) (supporting no-defect liability for injury that occurs while product is
used as intended); Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 559, 391 A.2d 1020, 1027 (1978)
(supporting no-defect liability where product not safe for intended use).
59 See Birnbaum, supra note 57, at 600-02 (describing how courts have struggled to differ-
entiate strict liability from negligence); Henderson, supra note 27, at 774-78 (describing use of
cost-benefit analysis to evaluate defective product design).
60 An influential writer has referred to this true, comprehensive form of strict liability as
"genuine strict liability." See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 441 (emphasis added).
61 For example, one writer has estimated that bringing the full societal cost of smoking to
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the current regime, a system of liability without defect would not allow
distributors of inherently and unavoidably dangerous products to escape
accountability in tort for the significant social costs their products
generate. 62
bear on smokers would increase the price of a package of cigarettes by $2.16. See Tribe, Anti-
Cigarette Suits: Federalism with Smoke and Mirrors, The Nation, June 7, 1986, at 788-89.
Professor Tribe's estimation seems unduly conservative, for he has not accounted for the enor-
mous transaction costs associated with such contentious litigation. In the asbestos cases, for
example, litigation expenses for the defendants accounted for approximately 36% of the total
award. These percentages do not reflect plaintiffs' attorney costs or costs to the judiciary for
managing the litigation. See J. Kakalik, P. Ebener, W. Felstinen & M. Shaley, Variation in
Asbestos Litigation Compensation and Expenses 82-91 (1984). For an excellent discussion of
the problems relating to managing complex, mass-tort litigation, see McGovern, Toward a
Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 440, 478-91
(1986). Under an across-the-board liability scheme, it is unlikely, given the prevalent attitude
of the courts, that a federal preemption argument would prevent the imposition of liability for
tobacco products. To date, five federal circuit courts of appeals have concluded unanimously
that all claims arising after 1965 based on failure to warn, misrepresentation, or fraud are
preempted by the 1965 Federal Cigarette and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1988).
See Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 420-21 (5th Cir. 1989); Roysdon v. R.J. Reyn-
olds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 233-35 (6th Cir. 1988); Stephen v. American Brands, Inc.,
825 F.2d 312, 313 (1lth Cir. 1987); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 626 (1st Cir.
1987); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 186-88 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1043 (1987). The United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari, see Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1386 (1991), to review the conflict between the federal cir-
cuits and the lone decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court holding that there is no federal
preemption. See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 76-80, 577 A.2d 1239,
1247-51 (1990).
However, most of the courts that have confronted the problem have ruled that preemp-
tion affects only claims based on inaccurate or inadequate information, since the 1965 Federal
Cigarette and Labeling Act speaks only to warnings. Claims that cigarettes have been
designed or manufactured defectively are not federally preempted. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Lig-
gett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 578 n.46 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Federal Labeling Act... does not
preempt design defect claims."), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1386 (1991); Pennington, 876 F.2d at
421-24 (preemption limited to common-law claims arising from labeling and promotional ac-
tivities). The grant of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court in Cipollone is directed
only at the failure-to-warn issue and does not touch the question as to whether claims of
defective design are preempted.
Since the prevailing authority limits preemption only to inadequate warning claims, if
courts were to adopt across-the-board liability without defect, it is unlikely that federal pre-
emption would prevent the imposition of liability. Of course, it is impossible to predict how
the United States Supreme Court would deal with the tobacco companies' argument that all
post-1965 claims are barred because by approving particular warnings, Congress has sub silen-
tio concluded that tobacco products belong on the market and meet risk-utility guidelines. It
is clear, however, that a system of across-the-board liability would preclude tobacco companies
from arguing that risk-utility requires an evaluation of the warnings in considering the overall
safety of cigarettes. See Pennington, 876 F.2d at 423 n. 11. Since liability would be causation-
based and thus independent of the alleged hazards of cigarettes, the court would have no need
to evaluate the warning and its impact on safety.
62 Because they have no cause of action against the makers and distributors of inherently
and unavoidably dangerous products, see, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, com-
ments i, k (1965) (suggesting that manufacturers of unavoidably unsafe products not be held
liable if these products have some utility), consumers are held, in effect, strictly liable for the
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Superficially, the differences between a liability-without-defect sys-
tem and our current system would not appear all that great. Admittedly,
under liability without defect, distributors would more likely be held lia-
ble on the basis of time-of-trial knowledge regarding the harms a product
causes, a significant expansion in their exposures when compared with
current law which focuses on the time of original distribution.63 But the
blueprint for issues such as successor liability, liability for economic
losses, punitive damages, and measurement-of-injuries presumably would
remain much the same. Although distributors would be held liable more
frequently than under our current system, eliminating the requirement of
defect would not be as radical a change as, for example, the wholesale
replacement of tort with a statutory scheme of no-fault compensation. 64
However, as the next section indicates, radical differences begin to appear
as one probes beneath the surface.
B. Problems of Implementation
Even if across-the-board liability without defect is theoretically at-
tractive-a proposition that the next section's discussion of potentially
negative market effects calls into doubt-our courts would be incapable
of implementing such a system for three reasons. First, eliminating the
defect requirement would create significant obstacles in the already com-
plex determination of causation. Second, difficult issues involving the
contributory fault of plaintiffs would have to be rethought and reworked.
Finally, abolishing proof of defect would present conceptual difficulties
when products beyond their useful lives caused injuries.
L Determining Causation
Given the central role causation would play in a system of liability
without defect, it is the logical place to begin our discussion of the
problems of implementation. Regarding but-for cause-in-fact, courts
would confront several sources of difficulty.65 The first would arise in
social costs generated by these products.
63 For a description and discussion of current law, see generally Henderson, supra note 40,
at 924-47. One example of a court imputing time-of-trial knowledge is Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982), which has been limited by decision,
see Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 97 N.J. 429, 437, 479 A.2d 374, 386 (1984), and by statute. See
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-3 (West 1990). Under current law, the need to perform risk-utility
analysis provides strong arguments against applying time-of-trial knowledge retroactively.
Under a regime of across-the-board liability without defect, having obviated the need to per-
form risk-utility analyses, courts could adopt more easily a time-of-trial perspective regarding
cause-in-fact.
64 See note 13 supra.
65 For purposes of this analysis, a product unit is a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries if
those injuries would not have occurred if the product unit had never been distributed. Thus,
any product unit that is a necessary condition to the plaintiff's injury is a cause-in-fact of that
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cases involving chemicals, drugs, and similar products alleged to have
caused injuries to exposed plaintiffs. Frequently, courts would have to
rely on ambiguous epidemiological proof in the form of marginal in-
creases in risks of injury. Among the most difficult problems courts con-
front under existing law,6 6 certainly they would be no less difficult under
liability without defect. Indeed, it can be argued that problems associ-
ated with reliance on epidemiological evidence would take on added sig-
nificance under a regime of liability without defect.67
Moreover, in cases involving ordinary durable and consumable
products, the truly daunting nature of but-for cause-in-fact under defect-
free strict liability becomes clear. Observe the array of potential defen-
dants that a court would have to consider in the following hypothetical.
P, after eating a heavy lunch consisting of three servings of pasta accom-
panied by two bottles of beer, climbs the stairs to the second floor of his
home to retrieve a book from his bedroom. Sleepily returning downstairs
to answer the door, P trips on a roller skate left by his nine-year-old
daughter, falls down the stairs, and crashes his head through the glass
screen of the television in the living room. Since proof of defect is no
longer required for the imposition of liability, the only question is which
product(s) caused the injury. The combination of P's eating pasta and
imbibing beer contributed to his being unsteady on his feet and less ob-
servant than usual. The skate helped propel him down the stairs. The
stairs and the television set are similarly implicated in P's injury. With
little effort, the net could be cast even more broadly. Would not the
manufacturers of the vehicles that delivered the pasta, beer, television
injury.
66 The difficulties of deciding what confidence level is sufficient to warrant a finding of
causal relationship has been the subject of considerable academic discussion. See, e.g., Cohen,
Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 385, 397-98 (1985) (arguing court must evaluate not only probability of causa-
tion but also probability of supporting evidence being wrong); Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical
Significance Relevant?, 61 Wash. L. Rev. 1333, 1364 (1986) (expert's role not to decide what
statistical evidence proves or disproves; this task for judges or juries). The scholarly debate
now has reached the courts in the Bendectin litigation. Compare Lynch v. Merrell-National
Laboratories, 830 F.2d 1190, 1194 (lst Cir. 1987) (neither animal studies nor study of chemi-
cals analagous to Bendectin "have the capability of proving causation in human beings in the
absence of any confirmatory epidemiological data") and Richardson by Richardson v. Rich-
ardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 829-31 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (animal, test tube, and chemical
studies did not support jury's determination that Bendectin caused birth defects at issue), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989) with Deluca by Deluca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911
F.2d 941, 953-54 (3d Cir. 1990) (allowing expert testimony based on epidemiological evidence
even though not statistically significant).
67 Under the present system, the causal question is muted somewhat by the fault inquiry;
many potential troublesome cause-in-fact issues never are addressed because the plaintiff can-
not show that the product was defective in design or warning. Under an across-the-board
liability scheme, causation would have to be addressed in every instance.
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set, and stairs be but-for causes of the harm? For that matter, the book
publisher also might be added to the list, especially if P had opened the
book to read as he was beginning to descend the stairs.
Moreover, once one adopts the general view that all product manu-
facturers who are causally implicated in an accident are viable defen-
dants, limiting the causation-driven liability system to product
manufacturers alone becomes extraordinarily difficult. Service-related
defendants arguably should be included as well. 68 Thus, the telephone
repair person who rang the bell that caused P to hurry his pace down the
stairs is as much a cause-in-fact of P's injury as any of the manufactur-
ers. Similarly, if the stairs were carpeted and the carpet was still wet as a
result of a recent cleaning, not only the carpet manufacturer but also the
commercial carpet cleaner might be deemed a contributing cause of the
injury. It is no easy matter to defend treating manufacturers of products
and suppliers of services differently under current law.69 In a world
where any causal involvement served as a predicate for products liability,
it would be much more difficult to justify exempting other causal actors
from responsibility.
Narrowing the list of causation-based defendants by some form of
proximate cause analysis does not solve the causation problem either.70
Although laying the risk of P's fall on the pasta manufacturer seems to
involve a stretch, excluding this defendant is possible only through an
impressionistic screening test. Such a liability-limiting doctrine would
require a fact finder to draw distinctions between defendants on a case-
by-case basis with almost no guidance from the law.71 Once fault or
defect is removed as the liability standard, the proximate cause issue has
no firm anchor. Even those who eschew full reliance on fault as the lode-
star for proximate cause recognize that fault plays a significant role in
65 Although we began our discussion assuming that liability would be attached to products
only and not to other activities, see text accompanying notes 54-55 supra, once causation is the
sole reason for the imposition of liability, this position becomes difficult to sustain.
69 For arguments that suppliers of pure services should be treated the same as product
manufacturers, see generally Baldwin, Products Liability as It Applies to Service Transactions,
43 J. Air L. & Com. 323, 333-36 (1977) (describing how courts, reluctant to impose strict
liability upon those who render service, instead have found liability in negligence); Greenfield,
Consumer Protection in Service Transactions-Implied Warranties and Strict Liability in
Tort, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 661, 688-96 (arguing that policy reasons underlying strict liability in
sale of goods context also apply to service transactions); Comment, Application of Strict Lia-
bility to Repairers: A Proposal for Legislative Action in the Face of Judicial Inaction, 8 Pac.
L.J. 865, 873-81 (1977) (same).
70 See Henderson, supra note 13, at 664-65 (arguing that proximate cause in strict enter-
prise liability system entails fact-intensive case-by-case analysis with higher administrative
costs).
71 Cf. note 163 infra (noting that some commentators have recognized absence of any ra-
tional basis or methodology to assigning liability in strict enterprise liability system).
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drawing causation-based limits on liability.72 Moreover, even if a proxi-
mate cause analysis arguably could exclude the manufacturers of the
-pasta and the television set, it could not so easily exclude the manufac-
turers of the beer, stairs, and roller skates. Tripping and falling is so
commonly associated with imbibing beer, descending stairs, and encoun-
tering roller skates that it is the stuff of slapstick comedy, and thus emi-
nently foreseeable as a consequence of using these products.
In discussing causation, we have thus far assumed that the events
leading up to the plaintiff's injury actually happened as described. In
our hypothetical case, for example, we assumed that P actually ate the
pasta, drank the beer, tripped on the roller skate, and fell down the stairs.
However, we now must recognize that these events probably are wit-
nessed only by the plaintiff or a close family member. The self-serving
testimony those witnesses offer at trial may implicate falsely and unfairly
one or more of these products. The defendant's only hope is that the jury
will be able to identify false testimony based on the witnesses' demeanors;
however, at a minimum, the plaintiff will reach the jury in every case.
Under existing law, the requirement that the plaintiff prove that a defect
caused her injury keeps problems of nonverifiability in check.73 With
respect to the roller skate in our hypothetical, for example, it is hard to
imagine how the plaintiff could succeed with his claim under current law.
For one thing, the plaintiff would have to have been roller skating at the
time of the accident, an inherently incredible hypothesis.
Nonverifiability is a serious problem in any system of court-applied
standards.74 Tort law, in particular, has been careful to avoid having
liability turn on events that can be established only by nonverifiable, self-
72 See Prosser & Keeton on Torts, supra note 15, at 279 (discussing approach of "justly
attachable cause" whereby "jury should be permitted to consider imposition of liability upon
'justly attachable causes,' on grounds of fairness and social advantage"); see also Palsgraf v.
Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 353, 162 N.E. 99, 104 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting)
("[What the prudent would foresee... may have some bearing for the problem of proximate
cause ...."); Green, Duties, Risk, Causation Doctrine, 41 Tex. L. Rev. 42, 57-58 (1962)
(actual consequences of defendant's conduct, as opposed to foreseeable and foreseen con-
seuqences, important in determining defendant's duty); Green, Foreseeability in Negligence
Law, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1401, 1423 (1961) (reasonable foreseeability, often linked with proxi-
mate cause, requires jury to consider whether defendant's conduct should be penalized).
73 With respect to defects based on design and failure to warn, the plaintiff must show a
failure in design or marketing and link that failure proximately to the injuries sutained. This
requirement substantially circumscribes, if it admittedly does not eliminate altogether, the
plaintiff's opportunities to concoct a false story.
74 See Henderson, Process Constraints in Tort, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 901, 913-14 (predicting
liability is difficult when facts nonverifiable); Henderson, supra note 51, at 792-94 (nonver-
ifiability especially problematic in cases such as those involving allergic reactions, in which
products do not leave distinctive "fingerprints" enabling court to rule out other possible
causes).
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serving testimony from one of the parties.75 Under liability without de-
fect, nonverifiability regarding causation would compromise seriously the
integrity of the liability system.
2. Users' and Consumers' Contributory Fault
Even though moving to liability without defect would represent a
commitment to higher levels of liability, presumably the system would
continue to recognize defenses based on plaintiff's contributory fault.
Eliminating such defenses arguably would be unfair and might under-
mine incentives for users and consumers to invest in care when they are
the lowest-cost risk minimizers. 76 On the assumption that most jurisdic-
tions would make the appropriate adjustments via comparative fault,77
courts would confront two problems of implementation. First, how
would they compare the fault of the plaintiff with the presumably non-
fault-based liability of the defendant? Many courts have gotten around
this conceptual "apples and oranges" problem under existing law by re-
quiring a showing that the product is defective and by comparing the
"fault" of the product with the fault of the defendant.78 If courts aban-
doned product defectiveness and began to apply "true" strict liability,
both judges and juries might confront conceptual difficulties in compar-
ing plaintiffs' fault with nothing more than the fact that the product is a
cause-in-fact (possibly one among many) of the plaintiff's injuries.7 9
75 See Henderson, supra note 51, at 763 nn. 9-10 (restricting consideration of mental state
to instances where it is objectively verifiable). Examples include the way courts have "objecti-
fied" the legal definitions of "intent" and "consent" in tort law. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Cunard
S.S. Co., 154 Mass. 272, 273, 28 N.E. 266, 266 (1891); Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197,
202, 279 P.2d 1091, 1094 (1955). See generally J. Henderson & R. Pearson, The Torts Process
19-20 (3d ed. 1988) (overviewing definitions of "intent").
76 See notes 183-84 and accompanying text infra.
77 A substantial majority of American jurisdictions apply comparative-fault principles in
prolucts liability cases. See H. Woods, Comparative Fault § 1:1 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1991)
(forty-five states, Puerto Rico, and Virgin Islands apply comparative negligence).
78 In Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967), the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin analogized the distribution of a defective product to the violation of a safety statute:
both actions create an unreasonable risk of harm to others, so that both are tantamount to
negligence per se. See id. at 451-52, 155 N.W.2d at 64. The court wrote that comparison of a
plaintiff's contributory negligence and defendant's negligence per se "is so common and widely
approved in our jurisdiction as to need no citation." Id. at 451, 155 N.W.2d at 64. The Court
reasoned that if the unreasonable danger generated by the defective product "is a cause, a
substantial factor, in producing the injury complained of, it can be compared with the causal
contributory negligence of the plaintiff." Id. at 453, 155 N.W.2d at 65. Twelve years later, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that contributory negligence may apply in a strict liability
action when the plaintiff has voluntarily and unreasonably taken a known risk, for "when two
parties 'share'... the blame for an accident they should also share the costs." Suter v. San
Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 162-64, 406 A.2d 140, 146-47 (1979).
79 For a case comparing product defect with plaintiff's fault, see Murray v. Fairbanks
Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 162 (3d Cir. 1979) (in action interpreting applicability of Virgin Islands
comparative-negligence statute, trier of fact ascribed fault to defendant based on product de-
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Second, in many cases courts would be required to reintroduce the
concept of product defectiveness to deal with the issue of the plaintiff's
fault. Cases would arise in which the appropriate response to the defen-
dant's comparative-fault assertion would be an argument that the defen-
dant owed the plaintiff an obligation in the first instance to avoid placing
the plaintiff in the predicament of being required to act, and possibly to
act negligently. An example will clarify the point: let us assume that the
plaintiff injures her hand in a punch press accident. The press manufac-
turer argues that the plaintiff was at fault in placing her hand in harm's
way. In response, the plaintiff argues that if the punch press had been
designed adequately, with a guard, or if the defendant had given ade-
quate warnings, the plaintiff's inadvertence would not have contributed
to causing the accident.
Courts under existing liability rules properly allow plaintiffs to make
this argument and, when appropriate, to escape any reduction in recov-
ery for their own comparative fault.80 Under existing law, therefore, the
nature of the product defect may rescue the plaintiff from the conse-
quences of what otherwise might be considered her own contributory
fault. Of course, the marginal costs of this further step in the analysis are
low; under existing law, the court already will have explored thoroughly
the nature and quality of the product defect. In contrast, under a regime
of liability without defect, the marginal costs of exploring product defec-
tiveness would be high. Allowing the plaintiff to make exculpatory argu-
ments would introduce for the first time an issue-the concept of product
defect-that the underlying liability standard had sought to eliminate.
And yet to foreclose the plaintiff from making this argument would be to
put the plaintiff arguably in a worse position than under existing law, a
result that is patently inconsistent with the proliability, expansionary bias
of the move to true strict liability for generic product hazards. It is not
clear how courts confronting this dilemma would, or should, respond.
Moreover, the problems described above also would arise in connection
with other issues such as product misuse, modification, and alteration.81
feet, then reduced award in proportion to plaintiff's causal contribution to injury). But see
Austin v. Ford Motor Co., 86 Wis. 2d 628, 643, 273 N.W.2d 233, 239 (1979) ("In a strict
liability action for wrongful death, the negligence to be compared is the negligence causative of
the death and not the negligence causative of the accident.").
80 See, e.g., Green v. Sterling Extruder Corp., 95 N.J. 263, 272, 471 A.2d 15, 20 (1984)
(permitting plaintiff to recover despite contributory negligence because plastic molding
machine should have been equipped with protective interlocking guard system that would have
prevented injury); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 412, 290 A.2d 281, 286 (1972)
(concluding that plaintiff's negligence did not bar recovery where that negligence "was the
very eventuality the... safety devices were designed to guard against").
81 These forms of user conduct may either entirely abrogate or partially mitigate manufac-
turer liability by assessing a percentage of fault to the party indulging in the undesired activity.
See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-683 (1982) (defendant shall not be liable for injuries proxi-
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3. Measuring Useful Product Life
Moving to strict liability without defect would present courts with
yet another implementation problem: for how long after original distri-
bution of a durable product are the manufacturer and distributor to be
on the liability hook? Under traditional approaches the defect that in-
jures the plaintiff must have been present originally at the time of initial
commercial distribution.82 This requirement of originality places tempo-
ral limits on defendants' responsibilities. In production-defect cases,
once a product unit reaches a certain age, or level of cumulative use, the
necessary inference of original defect cannot be drawn. 3 Moreover, in
cases in which products wear out and fail due to extended usage, the
defect-based concept of "for how long must a reasonable product be
designed to last?" provides a temporal limit to liability. s4 Finally, in
cases involving designed-in generic hazards, requiring the plaintiff to
prove original defect may exonerate defendants for failing to incorporate
safety-oriented technology that was not available at the time of initial
commercial distribution.85
mately caused by product alterations, modifications, or use not reasonably foreseeable by de-
fendant); Idaho Code § 6-1405 (1980) (defendant's liability will be reduced proportionately
upon defendant's proof that product alteration, modification, or misuse was proximate cause of
plaintiff's injuries); see also Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry Into the Emerg-
ing Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29 Mercer L. Rev. 403, 413 (1979) ("[J]uries should
be allowed to consider the likelihood at a percentage basis that a party's activities caused
harm." (emphasis in original)).
Since the issues with regard to product misuse, modification, and alteration require a
court to focus on whether the product should have been designed to take into account such
forms of product abuse that likely will take place, they cannot be examined without reflecting
back on the issues of defect. This examination would cause the defect issue to be examined for
the first time in the context of aberrant user conduct.
82 See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A comment g (1965) (strict liability "applies
only where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in [a dangerous] condition
not contemplated by the ultimate consumer .... The seller is not liable when he delivers the
product in a safe condition ....").
83 See, e.g., Western Sur. & Casualty Co. v. General Elec. Co., 433 N.W.2d 444, 449
(Minn. App. 1988) (directed verdict for defendant where six-year-old headlight exploded and
injured plaintiff because "lapse of time ... [made] it equally probable a defective condition
developed after leaving the defendant's control").
84 See, e.g., Glass v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 618 F. Supp. 314, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (defen-
dant combine manufacturer held not liable for plaintiff's injuries resulting from natural deteri-
oration of nonskid surface on equipment because "[to hold a manufacturer or seller liable for
... ordinary wear and tear would be to place the manufacturer or seller in the place of an
insurer"), aff'd, 789 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1986).
35 See, e.g., Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 749 (Tex. 1980) (defen-
dant could show that safety technology suggested by plaintiff at trial was unavailable at time of
product sale). See generally Henderson, supra note 40, at 952-59 (failure to include unknow-
able risk-avoidance technology at time of distribution would not achieve market deterrence of
manufacturers, improve allocative efficiency, or reduce transaction costs; moreover, achieve-
ment of loss spreading may be questionable where manufacturers are not able to forecast or
control technological advances and thus are unable to insure accurately against such liability).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
November 1991]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Abandoning the requirement of defect presumably would eliminate
these built-in temporal limits. A durable product that fails after many
years of use is no less the cause of a victim's injury than is a newer prod-
uct that fails. Existing law automatically adjusts for the relative age of
the product: the older product is less likely than the newer to be found
defective. Presumably, under a system of liability without defect, judges
could, and would, develop defenses based on the failures of victims and
product users to take reasonable steps to avoid unnecessary injuries in
connection with the continued use of older products. But the prima facie
case based on the brute fact of causation would be made out in all cases
involving old product units, where it is frequently (and appropriately)
not made out under traditional approaches requiring a showing of origi-
nal defect. And if courts allowed defendants to argue that "the product
cannot be expected to last that long," or "the product could not have
incorporated that safety device," the courts would be allowing defen-
dants to reintroduce the concept of defectiveness in much the same way
as with the issue of comparative fault.
As the foregoing discussions reveal, the products liability system re-
lies on the defect concept for cohesion. The defect requirement is more
than merely a convenient stopping place on a smooth continuum running
from "less" to "more" liability. The defect concept, in helping to define
the compensable event, frames the nature of the plaintiff's underlying
entitlement. 6 Even seemingly neutral, factual issues of causation be-
come incoherent unless they remain anchored to some adequately ar-
ticulable basis on which the plaintiff's rights rest. Thus, any across-the-
board attempt to abandon the requirement of defectiveness would place
courts and the products liability system in total chaos. And, as the next
section shows, even if some solutions to the practical problems of imple-
mentation were available, the probable effects of such a system would
generate costs that far outweigh its possible benefits.
C. A Brief Look at the Distortion Effects Across-the-Board Liability
Without Defect Would Have on the Behavior of Firms
and Individuals in the Marketplace
In Part I we considered the theoretical arguments that might justify
moving to a system of across-the-board liability without defect to demon-
strate how tempting defect-free strict liability can be to advocates of ex-
pansionary trends in liability law. But as the last section has shown,
there are serious questions regarding the capacity of courts to implement
86 See note 72 and accompanying text supra; see also Posner, supra note 44, at 218 ("from
an economic standpoint an inquiry into causation [absent independent criteria determining
entitlements] is vacuous").
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a system of defect-free liability. Were the considerations to end there,
one would be left with the task of making a difficult trade-off between
positive substantive objectives and negative process implications. In an
effort to show that the negative implications of implementation vastly
outweigh the positive values of achieving substantive objectives, we re-
turn to those objectives and examine them more carefully. That is, we
explore how liability without defect actually would affect, or be likely to
affect, behavior in the market and argue that such a system would gener-
ate tremendously undesirable substantive effects. Given that implemen-
tation problems appear insurmountable with respect to across-the-board
liability without defect, in this section we discuss only briefly the negative
substantive effects, leaving a more complete discussion of these effects to
Part III's exploration of defect-free product-category liability.87
1 Distortion Effects That Accompany Liability Systems in General
We begin by observing that no liability system, including our cur-
rent, traditional system, can be expected to work perfectly since courts
are bound to commit errors that send liability signals that are either too
weak or too strong. When the signals are too weak, actors to whom they
are directed will either underinvest in safety, overengage in hazardous
activity, or both. 8 Conversely, when the signals are too strong, actors
will either overinvest in safety, underengage in the activity, or both.8 9
And, if the overly strong signals are strong enough, many actors will
leave the market altogether. These patterns of over- and underinvest-
ment and engagement, which we refer to as "distortion effects," are so-
cially wasteful. 90
When one speaks of courts sending inaccurate liability signals, one
usually thinks of courts getting their risk-utility or causation calculi
wrong, or measuring the harms to plaintiffs incorrectly. If that is all that
sending inaccurate signals implied, then the previous discussion of imple-
mentation problems arguably would have anticipated all there is to say
about the inaccuracy of liability signals, and further discussion would be
beside the point. But liability signals may be wrong for other reasons,
87 See text accompanying notes 171-90 infra.
88 These conclusions are direct corollaries to those contained in the text accompanying
notes 41-48 supra.
89 If the accident cost that a marginal investment in safety would prevent is x, and the
investment is 2x, resources are preserved if the safety investment is not made. However, if the
system erroneously threatens the actor with liability of 3x, the actor rationally will make the
2x safety investment, thereby wasting, from society's standpoint, resources worth x (2x - x =
90 Theoretically, the tort system aims at minimizing the sum of accident and avoidance
costs. See G. Calabresi, supra note 41, at 26. When the costs of either accidents or accident
avoidance are greater than optimal, cost minimization will not occur, and waste will result.
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ones that relate directly to the proposal that courts adopt liability with-
out defect. For example, courts may make their calculations and mea-
surements accurately, but on the basis of aggregates-pools--of actors
who are not contributing uniformly to the generation of relevant accident
costs. If, as a result of this aggregation of dissimilar risk generators, a
uniform signal is sent to actors who are not contributing uniformly to the
risks, the signals will be too weak for some (the heavier risk contributors)
and too strong for others (the lighter contributors). 91 Since actors react
to liability signals on an individual basis rather than on the group basis
upon which the calculations were made, they will respond inappropri-
ately, thereby wasting scarce resources. This distortion effect is an impli-
cation of liability systems generally, but, as a subsequent discussion
demonstrates,92 it is a more serious implication of the defect-free liability
system we are here considering.
Yet even if a system succeeds in sending exactly the right liability
signals, the next section demonstrates that it may be possible for actors to
deflect or blunt the impact of those signals. These evasive responses will
be attractive in direct proportion to the intensity of the liability signals,
irrespective of whether the signals are appropriate. 93 One method by
which actors may insulate themselves from realizing the effects of liabil-
ity threats is by engaging in "hit-and-run" tactics. That is, a manufac-
turer might enter a potentially risky market with an undercapitalized,
underinsured corporation that is incapable of satisfying any future sizea-
ble judgments.94 In their extreme form, hit-and-run tactics assume the
proportions of black market operations where anonymity of producers
and distributors allows them to escape liability altogether. 95 Not only do
91 When the pooling of risks occurs via voluntary insurance, writers speak of the problem
of adverse selection, whereby the heavier contributors to risk are attracted to join the pool, and
the lighter contributors to leave the pool. See K. Abraham, Insurance Law and Regulation 3-5
(1990) (discussing effects of imperfect information in insurance industry, including adverse
selection and moral hazard); see also text accompanying notes 127-28 infra (discussing nega-
tive effects of pooling). "Joining" and "refusing to join the pool" are analogous to over- and
underengaging in risky activities.
92 See text accompanying notes 183-90 infra.
93 See note 89 supra.
94 For a discussion of the entry of "irresponsible" producers into uncertain markets, see
Siliciano, Corporate Behavior and the Social Efficiency of Tort Law, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1820,
1848-53 (1987); see also Note, An Efficiency Analysis of Vicarious Liability Under the Law of
Agency, 91 Yale L.J. 168, 197-98 (1981) (noting that, in absence of vicarious liability, judg-
ment-proof agent may undertake socially inefficient activity). Of course, corporate law encour-
ages risk-taking through rules limiting the liability of a firm's managers and directors. For a
general discussion of the interplay between products liability and corporations law, see J. Hen-
derson & A. Twerski, supra note 77, at 713-43.
95 For a discussion of the workings of black markets, see generally S. Ray, Economics of
the Black Market (1981). We speak not of an illegal black market but rather one that is simply
designed to avoid any liability tax. See Stayin, The U.S. Product Liability System: A Compet-
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these evasive responses frustrate the liability system's efforts to reduce
accident costs, 96 but also-to the extent they are nonproductive-their
implementation, in and of itself, imposes wasteful costs on society.97
2. The Unique Distortion Effects of an Across-the-Board System
of Liability Without Defect
Thus far we have focused on existing systems of liability, sketching
the negative behavioral effects likely to accompany such regulatory ef-
forts. This section examines how the proposed regime of across-the-
board liability without defect would exacerbate these problems. We ob-
serve at the outset that the distortion effects flowing from an across-the-
board system of liability without defect are difficult to predict with any
degree of precision. But we are quite certain that such effects would oc-
cur. The major result of the adoption of a defect-free causation-based
products liability system would be to increase significantly the liabilities
of producers and distributors of products. The potential magnitude of
these increases is difficult to underestimate. Defect-related injury is a
relatively rare event; product-related injury occurs almost as often as in-
jury itself.98
Raising the stakes of the liability game in this fashion would tend to
increase all of the negative distortion effects of the existing system. For
example, as the prices of inherently dangerous products in normal com-
mercial markets rose dramatically, one would expect the hit-and-run tac-
tics mentioned earlier to become increasingly attractive. Moreover, those
engaging in hit-and-run tactics would have little incentive to invest in
processes replete with optimum quality control. The result would be
"black-black" markets-both financially irresponsible and substantially
more dangerous than the commercial markets that exist under the tradi-
tional, defect-driven products liability system.99 Furthermore, since the
itive Advantage to Foreign Manufacturers, 14 Canada-U.S. L.J. 193, 207 (1988) (noting that
hit-and-run tactics are used to evade products liability tax and thus generate black markets).
Of course, once such markets come into being, they may very well seek to avoid state and
federal taxation as well.
96 If successful, evasive tactics cause liability signals to be weaker than they should be,
resulting in underdeterrence. See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
97 These evasive tactics are analytically analogous to the efforts of property owners to pre-
vent theft. The costs of such efforts are rationally borne by owners, at least to the point where
the marginal prevention costs equal the marginal theft costs; but they are wasteful from the
overall societal perspective. See Shavell, Individual Precautions to Prevent Theft: Private Ver-
sus Socially Optimal Behavior, 11 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 123 (1991).
98 In a modem, industrialized society it is difficult to imagine a serious accident that could
not be connected with one or more commercially distributed products.
99 One need not guess whether such a phenomenon would occur when manufacturers who
have no practical accountability supply the market. One of the great tragedies of Prohibition
was the large number of deaths caused by poisoned or adulterated alcohol. See J. Coffey, The
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products liability system imposes its liability premium on a one-shot ba-
sis at the time of distribution, the problem of some users and consumers
subsidizing, and being subsidized by, other users and consumers would
grow. Under the current approach, users and consumers who cannot
prove defect generally do bear, in the aggregate, accident costs roughly in
proportion to their levels of product usage. Eliminating the requirement
of defect would shift all product-related accident costs to producers and
distributors, causing all such costs to be borne on a per-purchase rather
than per-use basis.
Moreover, as the prices of new durable products such as
automobiles and washing machines rose dramatically to reflect the new,
greatly enlarged exposures of producers to liability, most users would
find it profitable to retain and continue to use older products and so es-
cape the liability tax on new products.1 0 Indeed, whether or not across-
the-board liability without defect were applied retroactively to products
sold earlier under the traditional defect-based system, adoption of liabil-
ity without defect would increase greatly the value of all durable prod-
ucts already distributed in commerce. Thus, users who purchased such
products prior to the new rule would have escaped paying for the new
regime of defect-free liability; and people to whom the purchasers there-
after sold such products also would escape because subsequent private
sales would be noncommercial and therefore beyond the reach of strict
products liability.101
Therefore, if liability without defect were adopted, noncommercial
and essentially unregulable markets in used durable products increas-
ingly would infringe upon commercial new product markets. With a pre-
mium placed upon product longevity, markets in replacement parts
likely would thrive. And while irresponsible, hit-and-run operators
might find it difficult to manufacture and distribute sizeable durable
Great Thirst: Prohibition in America: 1920-1933 196-200 (1975); E. Kellner, Moonshine -
Its History and Folklore 119-40 (1971). Newspaper reports during Prohibition years abound
with stories of deaths caused by contaminated whisky. See, e.g., Two More Victims Swell
Liquor Toll, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1927, at 4; 2 Whisky Deaths a Poison Mystery, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 10, 1921, at 1. One author even suggests that organized crime played a benevolent role in
public safety by supplying high quality alcohol while keeping inferior and dangerous alcohol
from the market. See F. Homer, Guns and Garlic 32-33 (1974).
10o See Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the
Courts, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 277, 291-92 (1985) ("[I]mpos[ing] greater costs on the safer substi-
tutes within particular markets... may encourage a shift in consumption toward the more
hazardous." (emphasis in original)).
101 Traditionally, noncommercial sales have not been captured by strict liability. Although
they could be, doing so would not serve the broader policies of strict liability. See Henderson,
Extending the Boundaries of Strict Products Liability: Implications of the Theory of the Sec-
ond Best, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1036, 1047-48 (1980); note 48 supra.
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products, 10 2 replacement parts could be manufactured more easily. Once
again there would be real cause for concern about the quality control
utilized for manufacturing such replacement parts since the manufactur-
ers serving such "black-black" markets would have little incentive to
produce optimally safe products.10 3 The substitution market would have
far-reaching effects; as the new causation-driven liability tax drove the
prices of new durable products dramatically upward, consumers at the
margin would turn in substantial numbers to noncommercial markets for
closely substitutable, yet nontaxable, products. And these effects would
be negative; not only would markets for new products be threatened, but
the used products, which increasingly would substitute for the new, pre-
sumably would present greater risks of accidental injuries.1 °4
Again, the distortion effects of broad-scale adoption of liability with-
out defect are impossible to predict precisely. But enough has been said
to make a convincing case for the proposition that, even if courts could
implement such a system and even if this system were justified in theory,
liability without defect actually would generate more undesirable effects
than desirable ones. The problem of hit-and-run tactics, black markets,
and flight to noncommercial used product markets involve what econo-
mists refer to as "second-best" situations. 10 5 In an effort to regulate ad-
mittedly regulable behavior more completely, the system increases the
liability costs of the regulated firms to the point where they and the con-
sumers with whom they deal turn to new patterns of essentially unregul-
able behavior to escape the higher liability costs of the regulated markets.
These substitution effects not only wreak havoc with traditional markets
for new products, but also make society, on balance, less safe than it was
with less regulation. In essence, the theory of the second best tells regu-
lators to think twice about forcefully regulating one area of activity when
those affected have access to a more-or-less substitutable area of activity
102 Any product that requires a large capital investment to produce and distribute probably
would not attract black marketeers because those capital assets would be accessible to tort
creditors. Of course, even under current law plaintiffs encounter difficulties obtaining and
satisfying judgments against foreign corporations who export their products to this country.
See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112-14 (1987) (plaintiff
could not assert jurisdiction over foreign component manufacturer). Moreover, foreign manu-
facturers simply could invite Americans to purchase durables such as automobiles abroad and
bring them into this country themselves.
103 See note 99 and accompanying text supra.
104 On average, a 30-year old automobile is riskier than a relatively new one. See Hender-
son, supra note 101, at 1073 n.172, 1081-85.
105 For a general discussion of second-best theory, see Lipsey & Lancaster, The General
Theory of Second Best, 24 Rev. Econ. Stud. 11 (1956); see also G. Calabresi, supra note 41, at
86-88 (costs of illegal conduct not internalized); R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 9.3,
at 202-03 & n.1 (2d ed. 1977) (second-best theory relates to gaps between private and social
benefits or costs); Henderson, supra note 101, at 1059-65 (tort reform efforts create problems
addressed under theory of second best).
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that cannot be reached effectively with similar regulation. It is quite pos-
sible that regulating "by halves" makes things worse, not better. 106
D.' Across-the-Board Liability Without Defect in American Products
Liability Decisions
While across-the-board liability without defect is not now and never
has been the operative rule in any American jurisdiction, several courts,
probably without fully realizing the scope of their pronouncements, have
come close to adumbrating such a rule.107 Others have approved of pol-
icy objectives that could be achieved only by the ultimate adoption of a
defect-free product liability system.108 This section examines the reason-
ing of these courts and evaluates their success in light of the implementa-
tion and policy concerns discussed above.
In a leading decision, the California Supreme Court held that a
plaintiff can establish a prima facie case for defective design by "showing
that the injury was proximately caused by the product's design." 1°
Once this showing is made, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove
that the product meets risk-utility norms.110 Although the ultimate de-
termination of product defectiveness remains dependent on risk-utility
balancing, the California formulation of the prima facie case for defective
design smacks of defect-free liability.l I1I In a recent case, for example, an
106 For applications of second-best theory to products liability, see Henderson, supra note
101, at 1059-65; Huber, supra note 100, at 290-305.
107 See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431, 573 P.2d 443, 455-56, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 237 (1978) (requiring plaintiff only to make prima facie case proving that product's
design proximately caused injury, whereupon burden shifts onto defendant to prove that prod-
uct was not defective); Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 559-60, 391 A.2d 1020, 1026-
27 (1978) (supplier is guarantor of its product's safety such that liability may be found where
"the product left the supplier's control lacking any element necessary to make it safe for its
intended use or possessing any feature that renders it unsafe for the intended use").
108 See, e.g., Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 251, 466 P.2d 722, 726, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178,
181-82 (1970) (purpose of strict products liability is to spread costs of compensating accident
victims throughout society); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377
P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963) ("Implicit in the machine's presence on the
market... was a representation that it would safely do the jobs for which it was built.");
Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 504, 525 P.2d 1033, 1041-42 (1974) ("imposi-
tion of [strict] liability has a beneficial effect on manufacturers of defective products both in the
care they take and in the warning they give"); Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance
Market, 14 J. Legal Stud. 645, 659 (1985) ("if redistribution is desired there is no reason why
the law should retain the requirements of causation and product defect"); Owen, supra note
40, at 708-09 (arguing that highly subjective consumer-expectations test is one-directional
since consumers usually do not plan to injure themselves with products and hence rarely ex-
pect such injuries to result).
109 Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
110 See id. at 432-33, 573 P.2d at 447, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
111 See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 466-67 ("The [Barker] rule places an enormous burden
on the concept of a 'product design that proximately causes injury,' a burden which the con-
cept seems ill-equipped to handle." (citation omitted)).
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intermediate California appellate court allowed a jury verdict to stand
where a plaintiff introduced no evidence of any alternative design that
could have prevented the injury. 112 In that case, a car collided with the
motorcycle that the plaintiff was driving, causing injury to her leg. The
plaintiff's prima facie case consisted of asserting that a design feature of
the motorcycle was the proximate cause of the injury. The plaintiff intro-
duced no evidence of a safer design alternative and the appellate court
found that none was necessary.113 With considerable justification, the
dissent argued that the plaintiff had established nothing more than that
her injury occurred while she was using the product. The dissent also
argued that there was not one shred of evidence that the product was
defective.11 4
Given that the defendant in the case just described could have de-
fended successfully by showing that its product met risk-utility guide-
lines, it may seem that the California rule is a long way from imposing
defect-free product liability. Nonetheless, as numerous observers have
noted, shifting the burden of proof to the defendant makes it difficult, if
not impossible, for a defendant to defend itself from liability. 115 It is
difficult enough to prove a negative. When the defendant bears the bur-
den of proving that a product is not defective, without being able to con-
sider what kinds of alternative designs should have been implemented,
the defendant must carry a daunting load.1 6 Ultimately, a jury can con-
clude that some alternative, about which it has heard no evidence, may
have been feasible. Even if they have not explicitly adopted liability
112 See Pietrone v. American Honda Motor Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1057, 1061, 235 Cal.
Rptr. 137, 139 (1987) ("'E]ven were it to be assumed that plaintiff's burden... required that
she demonstrate the existence of some alternative design which would have prevented or less-
ened her injury, this burden was met by... a cursory examination of [the motorcycle's]
configuration ....").
113 See id. ("In the instant case the evidence conclusively established that a design feature of
Honda's product-the open, exposed, rotating rear wheel in close proximity to the passenger's
foot pegs-was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. Without more, the burden then shifted
to Honda to justify its adoption and utilization of that particular design.").
114 See id. at 1090-91, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (Roth, J., dissenting) (allowing plaintiff "to sue
a solvent defendant in strict liability merely by alleging purchase of the product and the sus-
taining of injuries while using the product... corrodes the rule of law as accepted since
adversary trials have been an integral part of the administration ofjustice and substitutes an ad
hoc judicial dispensation of justice").
15 See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 27, at 782-97 (shifting burden of proof means that "no
defendant, however capably represented will succeed, other than by agreeing to settle, in avoid-
ing the retrospective evaulation of its design choices by lay jurors"); Schwartz, supra note 11,
at 468 (arguing burden of proof should not force defendant to disprove presumption of
negligence).
116 See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 468 ("If an auto accident ignites a gas tank, it is appar-
ently true that the location of the gas tank is a design feature of the car that has proximately
caused the injury. To rebut the Barker presumption of defect, must the car manufacturer rule
out, with trade-off evidence, every other possible gas tank location?").
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without defect, California courts clearly are flirting with such a rule.1 17
A fair number of jurisdictions have couched their tests for product
defect in whole or in part in terms of "consumer expectations." 118 Many
courts have acknowledged that this test for defect reflects the historical
influence of the implied warranty of merchantability on products liability
117 The California rule in Barker flirts with defect-free strict liability in much the same way
that generous res ipsa loquitur flirted with defect-based strict liability in the 1940s and 1950s.
See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462-63, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Tray-
nor, J., concurring).
118 See, e.g., Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 447 (10th Cir. 1976) (plaintiff
must prove that product was "dangerous beyond the expectation of the ordinary consumer" to
prevail in strict products liability action under § 402A of Restatement (Second) of Torts);
Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443, 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237-
38 (1978) (adopting two alternative tests for strict products liability: under first, plaintiff may
establish design defect by showing that product "failed to perform as safely as an ordinary
consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner;" under
second, design defect may be found upon proof of proximate cause by plaintiff and failure by
defendant to show that benefits of design exceeded design risks); Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg.
Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 834 (Iowa 1978) (plaintiff must show that product defect "not one
contemplated by the user... which would be unreasonably dangerous to him in the normal
and intended use thereof" to prove product unreasonably dangerous); Lester v. Magic Chef,
Inc., 230 Kan. 643, 653, 641 P.2d 353, 361 (1982) (noting that product may be found unrea-
sonably dangerous if it is more dangerous than ordinary consumer, possessed of knowledge
"common to the community," would expect; but refusing to adopt two-pronged test set forth
in Barker); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 108, 450 N.E.2d 204, 208, 463
N.Y.S.2d 398, 402 (1983) (product "not reasonably safe" if reasonable person, with knowledge
of design defect at time of manufacture, would find that product's risk exceeded its utility);
Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 467, 424 N.E.2d 568, 577 (1981)
("[A] product will be found unreasonably dangerous if it is dangerous to an extent beyond the
expectations of an ordinary consumer when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable
manner."); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326,
332, 230 N.W.2d 794, 798 (1975) (test for unreasonably dangerous product defect "depends
upon the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer concering the characteristics of
this type of product").
The test has academic supporters as well. See, e.g., Bermacchi, A Behavioral Model for
Imposing Strict Liability in Tort: The Importance of Analyzing Product Performance in Rela-
tion to Consumer Expectation and Frustration, 47 U. Gin. L. Rev. 43, 44 (1978) ("courts
should view a product as 'defective' to the extent that it frustrates the reasonable expectations
of the ordinary consumer"); Hubbard, Reasonable Human Expectations, supra note 49, at 465
("liability for product-related injuries ought to be apportioned in accordance with reasonable
human expectations" (emphasis in original)); Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory
and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. Rev. 803, 812-24
(1976) (contending that "in many cases the consumer expectations analysis produces a sound
result, in others the test works restrictively, producing results inconsistent with a sound risk-
benefit analysis of the problem"); Shapo, supra note 49, at 1192-96 (arguing that liability
"should concentrate initially and principally on the portrayal of the product" so that product
advertising may be "backdrop" supporting strict products liability under § 402B of Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts); Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectations: Enhancing
the Role of Judicial Screening in Product Liability Litigation, 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 861, 901-08
(1983) (arguing that under consumer-expectations test, strict products liability should apply
when products fail in normal use where normal use is defined in part according to product
image; where this test may not embrace all cases, such as foreseeable-misuse cases, test should
be applied in tandem with risk-utility analysis).
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law: "implicit in a [product's] presence on the market... [is] a represen-
tation that it [will] safely do the jobs for which it was built."' 19
Although much can be said in favor of a consumer-expectations test
as a barometer for product defect, 120 it suffers from one major, even fatal
flaw: its extreme subjectivity leaves the manufacturer open to the real
possibility of liability without defect.' 21 It is very difficult to rebut the
contention that a consumer's expectations were disappointed. 122 In fact,
as a practical matter, this standard for liability seems almost entirely rhe-
torical. Furthermore, since the consumer-expectations rationale stands
as an independent basis for liability separate and apart from risk-util-
ity,123 the defendant would not be absolved of liability even upon estab-
lishing that an alternative design would have been more dangerous than
the one actually used. The analogy to defect-free liability is too close to
ignore.
Finally, the Pennsylvania high court has adopted a test for defect
that in its direct terms seems close to defect-free liability, holding in ef-
fect that a manufacturer is a guarantor of the safety of its product.124
119 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1963); see also Gray v. Manitowoc Co., 771 F.2d 866, 869 (5th Cir. 1985)
("consumer expectation test of section 402A is rooted in the warranty remedies of contract
law, and requires that harm and liability flow from a product characteristic that frustrates
consumer expectations").
120 See authorities cited in note 118 supra.
121 See Model Uniform Products Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,722 (1979) (analyz-
ing § 104 of Act concerning construction defects); see also Billota v. Kelly Co., 346 N.W.2d
616, 621-22 (Minn. 1984) (consumer-expectations instructions to jury not appropriate for de-
sign-defect cases but are appropriate for cases involving inadvertent manufacturing defects
where jury can refer to flawless product as objective measure of alleged defect); Turner v.
General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 851 (Tex. 1979) (ruling that jury instructions based on
consumer expectations as test for unreasonable dangerousness should not include element of
ordinary consumer, and that "jury may be instructed ... to consider the utility of the product
and the risks involved in its use"); cf. Schwartz, supra note 11, at 476 n.241 (liability standards
should not differ among companies or consumers according to differences or changes in adver-
tising campaigns).
122 For an example of the extreme subjectivity of the consumer-expectations test, see Camp-
bell v. General Motors Corp., 32 Cal. 3d 112, 126-27, 649 P.2d 224, 232-33, 184 Cal. Rptr.
891, 899-900 (1982) (consumer-expectations test does not require expert testimony but in-
volves "the jurors' own sense of whether the product meets ordinary expectations as to its
safety under the circumstances presented by the evidence").
123 See cases cited in note 118 supra.
124 See Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 558-59, 391 A.2d 1020, 1026-27 (1978).
This decision has been treated harshly by most commentators. See, e.g., Birnbaum, supra note
57, at 636-39; Henderson, Products Liability: Controversial New Decision on Design Defects,
2 Corp. L. Rev. 246, 248 (1979); see also Comment, Returning the "Balance" to Design Defect
Litigation in Pennsylvania: A Critique ofAzzarello v. Black Brothers Company, 89 Dick. L.
Rev. 149, 172-73 (1984) (Azzarello "has generated an unacceptable and unnecessary level of
confusion" by holding that manufacturer is guarantor of its product's safety and by intimating
that absolute liability should be imposed on manufacturers); Note, Restatement (Second)
of Torts-Section 402A-Uncertain Standards of Responsibility in Design Defect Cases-Af-
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Although standing on its own this holding seems to call for defect-free
liability, the Pennsylvania court also held that a court has an obligation
to screen cases before they go to juries to see whether they meet risk-
utility guidelines. 125 Thus, the issue of whether a product is "unreasona-
bly dangerous" is a question of law for the court and not one of fact for
the jury.
As with the other expansive tests for defect discussed above, the
Pennsylvania "guarantor" test for liability does not adopt defect-free lia-
bility formally. Certainly, the court's arrogation to itself of some prelim-
inary review based on risk-utility guidelines mutes the harshness of its
liability test.126 Nonetheless, since juries in Pennsylvania routinely are
given cases in which they have free reign to impose liability without any
formal restraints, that jurisdiction's "guarantor" standard suggests that
courts are not far from practical implementation of a liability rule pro-
claiming injuries arising from product use compensable.
To the limited extent that American courts have flirted with across-
the-board defect-free liability, that concept has been the cause of consid-
erable mischief. By playing fast and loose with the definitions for defect,
some courts may have created systems in which manufacturers are to
some extent the insurers of their products for product-related injuries.
As discussed earlier, one source of perverse market incentives stems from
the aggregation, or pooling, of dissimilar risks under liability rules.1 27 As
we move from accident avoidance governed by a negligence standard to
an effective insurance scheme governed by a true strict liability standard,
these perverse incentives intensify. Not surprisingly, several leading
commentators have suggested that one of the reasons for the so-called
"products liability crisis" in recent years is that adverse selection has
destroyed the relevant insurance pools.128
Yet even in courts that articulate the most open-ended liability tests,
the formalities of fault and defect still exert significant restraint today.
Although some courts have given voice to doctrines that approximate
broad-scale liability without defect, clearly that approach has no hold at
ter Azzarello, Will Manufacturers Be Absolutely Liable in Pennsylvania?, 24 Viii. L. Rev.
1035, 1050 (1978-1979) (Azzarello "[neglected] to articulate any workable standard of
responsibility").
125 See Azzarello, 480 Pa. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026.
126 See Twerski, supra note 118, at 922-26 (demonstrating that under Azzarello, court first
goes through risk-utility analysis to decide if feasible alternative design exists, then jury decides
if "failure to implement the feasible design has sufficiently disappointed consumer expecta-
tions," and noting that this approach may be justified by "the fear that design defect litigation
may cause devastating consequences to industry").
127 See note 91 and accompanying text supra.
128 See Epstein, supra note 108, at 650-52; Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem
Tort Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1521, 1540-41 (1987); Priest, Puzzles of the Tort Crisis, 48 Ohio St.
L.J. 497, 500 (1987).
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the formal level in today's American tort law. If nothing else, the lip
service that is paid to the requirement of defect helps eliminate the imple-
mentation problems-especially with causation-that would render a
true system of no-defect liability impractical.
III
NARROWER FORMS OF LIABILrrY WITHOUT DEFECT:
PRODUCT- CATEGORY LIABILITY
Assuming that the problems associated with across-the-board liabil-
ity without defect are sufficiently daunting to prevent implementation of
such a system, might not courts consider narrower versions of the same
theme? The most obvious way to accomplish that objective would be to
impose liability without defect on a discrete and limited number of prod-
uct categories. This option may appear compelling at first blush, given
the public attention and concern over certain product categories such as
cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, and handguns. Yet as this Part demon-
strates, judicially applied product-category liability is plagued not only
by many of the same implementation and policy problems described
above, but also by a variety of problems unique to adopting such a
system.
Two approaches to product-category liability might compete for the
courts' attention: first, courts could choose the categories on the basis of
risk-utility balancing, deciding which categories, in the aggregate, gener-
ate more social costs than benefits; or second, courts could pick catego-
ries on the basis of some other criterion, perhaps because some categories
could be implemented more readily than others, because some are too
risky regardless of their benefits, or because some are more controversial.
Under any of these approaches, once a category is identified as appropri-
ate for strict liability, by implication all the products within that category
would be measured according to a no-defect strict liability standard; in
other words, distributors or manufacturers would be stricly liable for any
harm caused by their products whether or not these products could be
found defective under traditional products liability doctrines. The rele-
vant categories would be identified either by courts as a matter of law or
by juries on a case-by-case basis. 129 Liability then would follow along
the same general lines as across-the-board liability without defect. 130
129 To the extent that a risk-utility test were used, juries probably would decide whether to
impose categorical liability, just as they decide to impose negligence under current law. See
O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 184-86, 463 A.2d 298, 314-17 (1983); note 132 infra.
But if ultrahazardous-activity concepts were used, judges probably would set the categories.
See text accompanying notes 224-25 infra; note 225 infra.
130 See text accompanying notes 53-64 supra.
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A. Product-Category Liability: Some Initial Terminology
Before addressing the merits of the various product-category liabil-
ity proposals, we should clarify certain issues of terminology that might
seem confusing at first. Initially, one might argue that product-category
liability would rest on a finding of defectiveness-the entire product cat-
egory would be deemed defective either because it does not offer sufficient
benefits to justify the injuries it causes or because it satisfies some other
criterion.131 We prefer terminology that avoids reliance on defectiveness
because we feel that legal terminology, whenever possible, should clarify
what is happening in the litigation to which it refers. To stretch the term
"defective" to include broad categories of products that are not defective
in any traditional sense could mask the profound differences between this
use of the term "defective" and its more traditional uses. Courts that
have faced this issue appear to have sensed the possible confusion and
have avoided using "defectiveness" terminology. 132
Of course, this first point regarding terminology also raises a point
of substance: is risk-utility product-category liability really different
from the liability traditionally imposed on product designs based on risk-
utility balancing? If one were to think of every variation of product de-
sign as constituting a category unto itself-for example, if one thought of
slightly longer-handled bicycles and slightly shorter-handled bicycles as
constituting two separate categories-then the term "product-category
liability" would apply to every instance in which a plaintiff attacked a
product design as unreasonably dangerous, including all defective-design
131 In an early and influential piece, John Wade conflated the two senses of defectiveness
distinguished here and offered as a test for liability the following jury instruction: "A [prod-
uct] is not duly safe if it is so likely to be harmful to persons [or property] that a reasonable
prudent manufacturer [supplier], who had actual knowledge of its harmful character would
not placi it on the market." Wade, supra note 9, at 839-40. In a footnote, Wade makes clear
that the word "defective" could be substituted for the phrase "not duly safe." Id. at 840 n.47.
Framed in terms of "placing a product on the market," the concept of defectiveness would
include what we here refer to as product-category liability.
132 See, e.g., Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1210-11 (N.D. Tex. 1985)
(describing as "delightfully nonsensical" proferred "claim that a product which does not have
a defect can nevertheless, under the law, be defective"); Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 304 Md. 124,
138, 497 A.2d 1143, 1149 (1985) ("[R]egardless of the standard used to determine if a product
is 'defective' under § 402A, a handgun which functions as intended and as expected is not
defective within the meaning of that section."). Interestingly, the majority opinion in O'Brien
v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983), begins its discussion of liability with the
requirement of defect but avoids the defect terminology when discussing liability for product
categories based on risk-utility analysis. See id. at 181, 463 A.2d at 304; see also notes 197-203
and accompanying text infra (discussing this opinion in detail). In his concurring and dissent-
ing opinion, Judge Sehreiber recognizes the importance of the distinction between what we
refer to as "product-category liability" and more traditional liability based on "defect"; "Un-
til today, the existence of a defect was an essential element in strict product liability. This no
longer is so. Indeed, the majority has transformed strict product liability into absolute liability
.... " O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 192, 463 A.2d at 310 (Schreiber, J., concurring and dissenting).
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claims under traditional law. Thus, if a plaintiff injured while learning to
ride a bicycle argued that the handle bars on the bicycle should have
been slightly longer to increase side-to-side stability, she could be said to
be attacking the category of "shorter-handled bicycles." And yet intui-
tively one knows that an attack on slightly shorter-handled bicycles is
not categorical but marginal. The plaintiff is not attacking the category
"bicycles" but rather a marginal variation within the category. In con-
trast, if the plaintiff were to argue that three wheels, arranged triangu-
larly, are required to achieve adequate lateral stability, she would be
making a categorical assault on bicycles. The essential difference be-
tween these two claims is what distinguishes product-category liability
from traditional liability for defective design.
The variable that determines whether one is dealing with a product
category or merely a marginal design variation within a category is the
degree of substitutability of the alternative suggested by the plaintiff and
the product as designed by the defendant. In traditional, intracategory
design litigation, the alternative design suggested or implicated by the
plaintiff is a relatively close substitute for the product as designed by the
defendant. Bicycles with slightly longer handle bars are close substitutes
for bicycles with slightly shorter handle bars. Presumably, if plaintiffs
succeeded with longer-handle bar claims, the new alternative design
would resemble so closely the older design as to be nearly a perfect sub-
stitute, thus effectively driving the former variation, which alone would
carry the burden of tort liability, from the new bicycle market. A few
bicycle design purists might be willing to pay a substantial premium for
the older, shorter-handled but less stable design. But intuitively, it seems
likely that this demand would be so small that it would not justify the
continued mass production of the earlier design.
In contrast, when a plaintiff attacks a bicycle design on the ground
that a two-wheeled cycle is inherently unsafe, the next best alternative-a
tricyle-is not a very close substitute.133 Although a far better substi-
tute for a bicycle than many other products, a tricycle is a much less
suitable substitute for a bicycle than was the two-wheeled cycle with
slightly longer handle bars. Indeed, a tricycle is so poor a substitute for a
bicycle that if a court held that three wheels were minimally required to
produce a safe cycle, it would be imposing liability not for how the defen-
dant designed the bicycle but for having designed and distributed any
sort of bicycle in the first place. Drawing on terminology currently in
use, the court could be said to condemn bicycles for the "unavoidably
133 Similarly, if one attacked a three-wheeled vehicle by insisting on four wheels, the attack
would be categorical. See, e.g., Antley v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 539 So. 2d 696, 703
(La. App. 1989) (plaintiff attacked three-wheel all-terrain vehicle based on "inherent
instability").
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unsafe" aspect134 that defines two-wheeled transportation: lateral insta-
bility at low speeds. In other words, the court would be condemning the
product for the very design feature-two-wheeledness-that not only
rendered it more dangerous but also made it desirable to a majority of its
users and consumers.
Another point regarding terminology relates to why we prefer
"product-category liability" over "risk-utility balancing," a phrase used
by some commentators to refer to the cases upon which we are focus-
ing. 135 In the first place, some approaches to product-category liability
outlined above-for example those based on the controversiality of the
category-would not involve risk-utility balancing. Additionally, the
term "product- category liability" better describes what is happening-or
what plaintiffs argue should be happening. Risk-utility terminology
serves a number of different functions in products liability doctrine, in-
cluding traditional tests for defective design. 136 In the present context of
liability without defect, the term "risk-utility" inadequately distinguishes
the phenomenon to which it refers from the other phenomena to which it
refers in other contexts.
B. Problems of Implementation Presented by
Product-Category Liability
Despite its being a narrower, more containable system than the sys-
tem of across-the-board no-defect liability discussed in Part II, product-
category liability is not implemented easily. More specifically, as this
section demonstrates, although courts are better equipped to deal with
issues of causation under this system, they do not possess the institu-
tional competence to adopt a risk-utility-based version of product cate-
gory-liability in the first place. Nor are they capable of implementing
versions of product-category liability based on criteria other than risk-
utility balancing.
134 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment k (1965) (describing problem of
"unavoidably unsafe products").
135 See, e.g., W. Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability 11-12 (1991) (advocating "reformu-
lation of the risk-utility test" in context of design defects); Viscusi, Wading Through The Mud-
dle of Risk-Utility Analysis, 39 Am. U.L. Rev. 573, 585 (1990) ("strict liability [as applied] is
not tantamount to absolute liability"); Note, supra note 10, at 2066-69 (adoption of O'Brien
extension of risk-utility test for design defect "would allow a court to hold manufacturers
liable for accidents arising from the use of products for which no feasible alternative design
exists").
136 See authorities cited in note 59 supra.
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1. Why Courts Are Not Competent to Implement Risk- Utility-Based
Product-Category Liability
a. Risk-Utility and the Issues of Contributory Fault, Useful Product
Life, and Causation. Recall that adoption of across-the-board strict lia-
bility, by eliminating the requirement of defect, would create significant
problems for courts trying to resolve issues of contributory fault, 137 use-
ful product life,' 38 and causation. 139 The elimination of the linchpin ele-
ment of defectiveness would eliminate the baseline framework upon
which intelligent analysis and resolution of these issues rest. Product-
category liability, by retaining at least the categorical judgment of rea-
sonableness if not the marginal judgment of defectiveness, would appear
to supply at least some of the analytical framework missing in across-the-
board liability without defect. For example, with respect to plaintiff's
contributory fault, the unreasonableness of the product category could be
balanced more easily against the unreasonableness of the plaintiff's
conduct.
First appearances, however, are likely to be deceiving. Having con-
cluded that the product in question should never have been distributed in
the first instance, some courts might be tempted to conclude that plain-
tiff's fault should play no role at all. Their reasoning would be that if the
product had never been distributed, it could not have been the object of
plaintiff's foolish, risky behavior. But eliminating plaintiff's fault is
viewed by most courts and commentators as unwise. 140
For courts that sensibly decided to retain contributory fault, the
tasks of assessing that fault and deciding when to count it against the
plaintiff would be much more difficult than under traditional defect-
based approaches to liability. The source of the difficulty inheres in the
difference between a categorical versus marginal approach to product de-
sign. Under the traditional, marginal approach, the court undertakes a
careful and precise evaluation of the particular design's reasonableness
compared with feasible design alternatives.14 1 If adding a slightly differ-
ent safety feature would have saved-and thus "forgiven"-the plain-
tiff's foolish inadvertence, then probably the plaintiff's foolishness
137 See text accompanying notes 76-81 supra.
138 See text accompanying notes 82-86 supra.
139 See text accompanying notes 65-75 supra.
140 See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr.
380 (1978); Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., 97 Ill. 2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983); Duncan v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984); Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negli-
gence, 42 Tenn. L. Rev. 171 (1974); Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiff's Fault-The Uni-
form Comparative Fault Act, 29 Mercer L. Rev. 373 (1978).
141 See, e.g., Garst v. General Motors Co., 207 Kan. 2, 484 P.2d 47 (1971); Troja v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 62 Md. App. 101, 488 A.2d 516 (1985); Macri v. Ames McDonough Co.,
211 N.J. Super. 636, 512 A.2d 548 (1986).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
November 1991]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
should not count for much. But when the entire product category is
condemned on risk-utility grounds and the court decides that it should
not forgive, for that reason alone, all of the plaintiff's foolishness, the
remaining question of "how much foolishness should this particular de-
sign forgive?" is begged rather than answered meaningfully by the cate-
gorical judgment of unreasonableness.
The problem posed by the categorical, as opposed to marginal, na-
ture of the reasonableness judgment in product-category liability is even
more obvious in connection with the issue of useful product life. Under
across-the-board liability without defect, the absence of any element of
original defect renders unresolvable the issue of how long a product
should last.142 Reintroducing the risk-utility analysis categorically in
product-category liability might be thought to reintroduce a framework
with which to decide the "how long?" question. But by introducing rea-
sonableness only categorically, product distributors cease to be liable for
old durable products only when those products are so old as to cease to
be includable in the product category in question.
An example will clarify the point being made. Under traditional
analysis, when a five-year-old aboveground swimming pool collapses due
to metal fatigue, the plaintiff argues that a slightly stronger, slightly more
expensive design would not have collapsed as soon as the defendant's
pool. Because the reasonableness analysis is marginal, the cost of the
alternative design supplies a built-in constraint on how long such pools
may be expected to last-an aboveground pool designed to last thirty or
forty years, for example, probably would be prohibitively expensive.
Under product-category liability, in contrast, aboveground pools are con-
demned as unreasonably unsafe categorically. Once that judgment is
made, no marginal cost consideration constrains or guides the court's
judgment regarding how long any given aboveground pool should last,
except some vague, intuitional sense that bigger, stronger-looking
aboveground pools probably should last longer-but who is to say how
much longer-than smaller, flimsier-looking ones.
Finally, recall that a major stumbling block preventing courts from
implementing across-the-board liability without defect is the issue of cau-
sation, both causation-in-fact and proximate causation. 143 Narrowing
the focus from across-the-board to discrete product categories would
eliminate some, but by no means all, of the difficulties identified in the
earlier discussion. With respect to durable products-small handguns,
for example-issues of cause-in-fact would be manageable; courts are
competent to determine whether the plaintiff was shot by a handgun and
142 See text accompanying notes 82-86 supra.
143 See text accompanying notes 65-75 supra.
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whether the defendant produced that handgun. However, problems of
verifiability would plague product-category liability in all but the sim-
plest cases. To return to the hypothetical used in the discussion of
across-the-board liability,144 if roller skates comprised the only product
category in that case deemed unreasonably dangerous, courts theoreti-
cally could conclude that the roller skate was a cause-in-fact of the plain-
tiff's fall and resulting injuries. When six or seven products are
implicated, the analysis can become complicated; but with one product,
the analysis is much simpler. As a practical matter, however, verifying
that the plaintiff tripped on a roller skate and not over his own feet would
present serious difficulties. The only eyewitnesses are likely to be
strongly biased in the plaintiff's favor, and the lack of a defect require-
ment eliminates circumstantial clues regarding what really happened.
The defendant's only recourse would be to hope a jury would be able to
sort out true claims from false claims based on the plaintiff's demeanor
as a self-serving witness.1 45 Verifiability problems are presented under
traditional law,146 but because the plaintiff must prove that a product
defect caused her injury, such problems do not threaten to explode.147
In cases involving consumables, cause-in-fact would be considerably
more difficult, and frequently would involve multiple causation problems
not unlike those presented in Part II in the stairs hypothetical. Assume,
for example, that the category of cigarettes was deemed unreasonably
dangerous. The questions whether the plaintiff's illness was caused by
smoking and, if so, which producers' products are implicated, in many
cases, would defy coherent resolution. 148 For example, imposing prod-
uct-category liability would ensure that the enormously difficult
problems posed today by failure-to-warn prescription drug cases '49
144 See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra.
145 See text accompanying notes 73-75 supra.
146 See, e.g., Hollis v. Ouachita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 196 So. 376, 378 (La. Ct. App.
1940) (responding to plaintiff's claim of injury from ingesting soft drink containing harmful
material, court stated, "Of course, in a suit of this nature the plaintiff must establish that the
complained of injury was proximately caused by the act or omission on which defendant's
contended liability is predicated. Furthermore, the proof offered by the complainant should be
carefully scrutinzed, because the manufacturer usually has no means of disproving by eye wit-
nesses the occurrence of the alleged accident ...
147 See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
148 For a discussion of these problems, see Stein, Cigarette Products Liability Law in Tran-
sition, 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 631, 662 n.207 (1987) (noting impossibility of knowing whether indi-
vidual would have contracted disease had he never used tobacco products makes proof of
actual causation difficult); see also Note, The Great American Smokeout: Holding Cigarette
Manufacturers Liable for Failing to Provide Adequate Warnings of the Hazards of Smoking,
27 B.C.L. Rev. 1033, 1047-49 & n. 118 (recognizing that plaintiff must prove that defendant's
product both actually and legally caused injury; moreover, proximate cause sometimes frus-
trated by intervening forces substantial enough to be actual cause of disease).
149 The issue of the indeterminate defendant is at the center of the DES litigation. The
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would become a steady diet for the courts.
Proximate causation also would be difficult to prove in many prod-
uct-category liability cases. Assume, for example, that a court or jury
finds alcoholic beverages to be unreasonably dangerous. Returning to
our stairs hypothetical, would the producer of the beer that the plaintiff
drank be liable for having helped cause the drowsiness that contributed
to the plaintiff's fall? Admittedly, courts could reexamine the risk-utility
balancing that led to a particular category's being singled out in the first
place to determine whether the particular accident was within the scope
of the contemplated risks. 150 To that extent, product-category cases dif-
leading cases recognizing proportional liability are: Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d
588, 599-601, 607 P.2d 924, 935-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 145-46, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 168-70, 342 N.W.2d 37, 46-48, cert. denied,
469 U.S. 826 (1984); see also McCormack v. Abbott Laboratories, 617 F. Supp. 1521, 1526 (D.
Mass. 1985) (holding that market-share liability is available in DES case); McElhaney v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265, 269-70 (D.S.D. 1983) (holding that plaintiff does not bear
burden of identifying source of DES); Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp.
1353, 1358-59 (E.D. Tex. 1981) (recognizing practical impossibility of isolating precise cause
of injury and determining that Texas court would apply enterprise liability in asbestos case),
rev'd in part, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581,
604-05, 689 P.2d 368, 382 (1984) (holding that manufacturers and distributors of DES may be
held liable under "market-share alternate" theory).
For commentary on market-share liability, see Note, Market Share Liability: A New
Method of Recovery for D.E.S. Litigants, 30 Cath. U.L. Rev. 551, 554 (1981) ("[Mlarket share
liability is a novel yet well-founded approach to litigation involving fungible defective prod-
ucts, consistent with the prior doctrine of products liability law, and represents a necessary
expansion of tort liability .... ); Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the D.E.S.
Causation Problem, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 668, 680 (1981) ("[M]arket share approach not only
provides compensation to victims of DES, but may promote deterrence of similar occurrences
in the future... [and shows] the courts demonstrated willingness to use probability to resolve
causation problems when inequity would result from the mechanical application of traditional
doctrine.").
However, a substantial number of courts have rejected the market-share approach even in
the DES cases. See, e.g., Mizelli v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589, 594-96 (D.S.C. 1981);
Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1015-18 (D.S.C. 1981); Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
137 Ill. 2d 222, 228-33, 560 N.E.2d 324, 326-28 (1990); Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386
N.W.2d 67, 74-76 (Iowa 1986); Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241,245-58 (Mo. 1984) (en
bane).
The cigarette litigation to date has avoided the problem of defendant identification be-
cause plaintiffs' attorneys wisely have chosen to litigate only those cases in which the plaintiff
had substantial brand loyalty. See cases cited in note 61 supra. Admittedly, cigarettes will
never suffer from the total inability to identify the defendant because a smoker will know the
various brands of cigarettes he or she has used. However, it is unlikely that courts will be
prepared to impose classic joint and several liability on an entire industry without some appor-
tionment formula. Furthermore, claims by passively injured plaintiffs based on environmental
smoking damage would confront the DES identification dilemma.
150 See James, General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence?,
24 Tenn. L. Rev. 923, 927 (1957) (explaining that strict liability applies only if injury traceable
to unreasonably dangerous quality of product which arose in ordinary use or use of which
defendant was aware and if that quality existed before product left defendant's control); James,
The Untoward Effects of Cigarettes and Drugs: Some Reflections on Enterprise Liability, 54
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fer from across-the-board liability. Such analysis would be difficult
nonetheless.
b. Identifying Unreasonably Dangerous Product Categories. Even
if causation were deemed manageable in these product-category liability
cases, the shoal upon which that approach surely would founder is the
risk-utility balancing necessary to single out particular product catego-
ries for special treatment. To understand why such balancing asks more
of courts than they can deliver, it is necessary to examine more closely
the adjudicative process by which courts reach decisions.
For the traditional process of adjudication to work rationally and
properly, the parties must use applicable legal doctrine to focus their
claims so that they may insist upon a favorable outcome as a matter of
right.151 As Professor Fuller explained, some problems are polycentric in
nature.152 They consist of elements that are connected to one another as
are the strands of a spider's web, so that a decision with regard to any
element affects the decisions with regard to all the others. Such problems
are not suited to judicial resolution because neither side can move from
element to element in an orderly sequence.
A certain degree of polycentricity inheres in defective product de-
sign cases generally.1 53 Yet courts are able to manage in these traditional
contexts because plaintiffs typically propose alternative designs and ask
the judiciary to focus on the relatively small, marginal differences be-
tween the defendant's design and the proposed alternative. 154 With
product-category liability, no comparison of marginal differences is nec-
essary because the plaintiff is arguing that the entire product category,
including all possible variations therein, should be subject to absolute lia-
bility. Quite literally, the question asked in product-category liability
cases is: "taking all relevant considerations into account, is the product
category in question appropriate for use and consumption in society?"
Thus, the polycentricity that inheres in traditional design cases is magni-
fied enormously.
That risk-utility-based product-category liability cases would be
unadjudicable can be seen by considering how the parties would attempt
Calif. L. Rev. 1550, 1554, 1557-58 (1966) (arguing that task of deciding whether new, un-
known risks make already singled-out product "unreasonably dangerous" is well within ability
of judiciary).
151 See Henderson, supra note 23, at 1539-42.
152 See Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 395-404
(1978).
153 See Henderson, supra note 23, at 1534-42; Twerski, supra note 25, at 550-53.
154 One of us argued years ago that courts were not competent to review manufacturers'
conscious design choices. See Henderson, supra note 23, at 1534-42. Later, he grudgingly
conceded that courts could manage, but only if they relied on a feasible alternative design
approach. See Henderson, supra note 27, at 779-81.
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to argue a typical claim. For example, in connection with a claim that
small, cheap handguns are unreasonably dangerous and should be sub-
ject to strict liability, how small is small? How cheap is cheap? For what
range of accidents and adverse outcomes are distributors to be liable?
Are suicides by handguns to be compensable? How are the parties to
obtain relevant data on the social costs associated with small handguns,
especially if they cannot agree on the relevant parameters of the prob-
lem? Presumably small handguns serve useful as well as wasteful social
purposes: people collect them as hobbyists and possess them for protec-
tion, deriving pleasure and senses of well-being. How can a court quan-
tify those utilities?1 55
To be answered rationally, the question whether handguns of a par-
ticular size and monetary price are "good for society" would require ex-
tended legislative or administrative hearings and investigations. Even if
courts attacked these problems incrementally, on a case-by-case basis, it
is unrealistic to hope that courts could adjudicate their ways to intelli-
gent, consistent solutions. Bearing in mind the magnitude of the stakes
involved-imposing absolute liability might tax small handguns off the
market-it is hardly surprising that most courts have refused to get
involved.156
We believe, along with commentators,1 57 legislatures,1 58 and
courts, 5 9 that these problems render risk-utility product-category liabil-
155 See Note, Handguns and Products Liability, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1912, 1927 (1984) (posing
similar questions in arguing that handgun control is issue for legislatures and not courts).
156 See, e.g., handgun cases cited in note 192 infra.
157 See, e.g., Note, The Smoldering Issue in Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc.: Process
Concerns in Determining Whether Cigarettes Are a Defectively Designed Product, 73
Cornell L. Rev. 606, 622-26 (1988) (discussing benefits of having courts screen design-
defect cases); Birnbaum & Wrubel, The Difficulty in Defining a Test for Use in Design-
Defect Litigation, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 19, 1983, at 42 ("What we are left with when [defect
is no longer required] ... is an approach that permits juries, rather than market forces,
to make highly individualized value judgments about whether certain products should
be made available at all for sale.").
158 The New Jersey legislature in 1987 superceded O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J.
169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983). See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-3 (West 1987) (manufacturer
or seller not liable for defective design if at distribution "there was not a practical and
technically feasible alternative design that would have prevented the harm without sub-
stantially impairing the reasonably anticipated ... function of the product"); see also
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.51-57 (West Supp. 1991) (prohibiting finding of defective
design when no alternative existed). The authors have testified in several state legisla-
tive hearings in favor of this kind of legislation.
159 Courts have recognized the difficulty of applying risk-utility based product-category lia-
bility in several contexts. See, e.g., Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1271-77 (5th Cir.
1985) (marketing of handguns not ultrahazardous since harm is caused by substandard con-
duct of third parties); Maguire v. Pabst Brewing Co., 387 N.W.2d 565, 572 (Iowa 1986) (de-
fendant not liable given that risks of intoxication were well-known to consumers at large);
Howard v. Poseidon Pools, Inc., 72 N.Y.2d 972, 972-73, 530 N.E.2d 1280, 1280-81, 534
N.Y.S.2d 360, 360-61 (1988) (plaintiff unable to recover for injuries from defendant pool man-
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ity unmanageable for the courts. As with the issue of proximate cause, if
adequate risk-utility balancing somehow could be accomplished, it would
help, at least theoretically, the courts to sort those other issues out. 160
2. Why Courts Are Not Competent to Implement Product-Category
Liability Based on Other Criteria
This section considers the viability of systems of product-category
liability based on criteria other than risk-utility balancing. These criteria
might include extreme riskiness irrespective of benefits derived from use
or consumption, political contoversy surrounding the category, or feasi-
bility of implementation. The courts capably could apply product-cate-
gory liability if the rules adopted were extremely narrow and focused.
For example, if a high court were to decide to impose strict liability only
on Reynolds Tobacco Company and only for lung cancer suffered by
persons who smoked at least one pack a day of Reynolds's products, and
only Reynolds's products, for at least five years, the courts could adjudi-
cate coherent, consistent outcomes. In other words, courts are compe-
tent to apply such a narrow rule case-by-case. The problem is that
courts are not institutionally competent to adopt such a rule.161
The courts would be no more institutionally competent to adopt the
somewhat broader approach of imposing strict liability on all cigarette
manufacturers for all injuries proximately caused by cigarette smoking.
Unless the court articulates an underlying rationale that would support
even-handedly imposing liability on producers of other products that ar-
guably pose serious threats to public health and safety, the suggested an-
ticigarette rule is arbitrary in the same fundamental way, if not quite to
the same degree, as the Reynolds Tobacco rule. While the implementa-
tion problems that stem from reliance on risk-utility analysis are elimi-
nated, the cost is the court illegitimately exceeding its institutional
prerogatives. And the other implementation problems identified ear-
lier162 would be more difficult here than in connection with risk-utility
based product-category liability because of the absence of risk-utility bal-
ancing, which lessened those implementation problems.
ufacturer since plaintiff's reckless conduct obviated any failure to warn); Morris v. Adolph
Coors Co., 735 S.W.2d 578, 582-84 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (beer manufacturer's products not
defective since they were safe for normal consumption); Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 107
Wash. 2d 127, 132-34, 727 P.2d 655, 660-61 (1986) (en bane) (refusing to expand strict liability
to extent that trail bikes would be outlawed). But see O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 185, 463 A.2d at 306
(applying risk-utility analysis to aboveground swimming pool).
160 See authorities cited in note 72 supra.
161 Moreover, the arbitrariness of such a narrow approach is so obvious as to generate legiti-
mate cries of outrage and, we trust, constitutional review. See authorities cited in note 169
infra.
162 See notes 151-60 and accompanying text supra.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
November 1991]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
A concrete example helps make these points clear. Let us suppose
that a high court announced, without engaging in risk-utility balancing,
that because small handguns are very dangerous henceforth they would
be subject to strict liability without defect. One may object, of course, to
the seeming arbitrariness of picking out handguns for such treatment, a
point raised earlier. But here, to assess potential problems of implemen-
tation, we assume a court ignored those difficulties and announced, by
fiat, the strict liability rule we have described. On what legitimate basis
would the court decide if a plaintiff, injured by being "pistol whipped,"
could recover? Had the original court attempted a risk-utility balancing,
the present court might solve this proximate cause issue by referring back
to the value judgments inhering in that balancing. Having eschewed
such balancing, however, to what other source would the court refer?
Intuition?163 Should the court leave the decision to successive juries on
deliberately vague instructions?
Trying to apply product-category liability catches the court between
a rock and a hard place. The hard place is the frustration of trying to
run a legitimate, fact-based, risk-utility balancing. The rock is the arbi-
trariness of refusing to run one. The court cannot have it both ways.
And either way it chooses, it exceeds the limits of its institutional
competence.164
163 See notes 107-26 and accompanying text supra. Professor Schwartz recognizes the diffi-
culty of assigning liability without first performing risk-utility analysis. He remarks, "[I]f lia-
bility were imposed on the sole basis of a product's factual involvement in an accident, one
does not even know what methodology to utilize in developing a 'correct' apportionment
formula." Schwartz, supra note 11, at 447. Professor Klemme makes the same observation in
his critique of enterprise liability: "On what rational basis should the law decide which partic-
ular enterprise the loss should be treated as a cost of having engaged in?... The theory of
enterprise liability as it is usually put does not provide a rational answer to this basic ques-
tion." Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. Colo. L. Rev. 153, 162
(1976). Writers nevertheless have advanced what appear to be intuition-based alternatives to
risk-utility analysis. See, e.g., A. Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault: Trends Toward An
Enterprise Liability for Insurable Loss 52-62 (1951) (liability limited to losses "typically"
caused by enterprise in question).
164 When contrasting the competence of courts to monitor product designs at the margin
with their lack of competence to decide whether broad categories of products should be mar-
keted at all, an interesting question arises: would adopting liability without defect have spill-
over effects on the traditional process of marginal design review? The traditional approach to
defective design retains considerable vigor because in every design case the plaintiff must prove
a feasible alternative. If product-category liability were to be adopted, it would no longer be
unthinkable to ban a product from the market even though no feasible alternative exists.
Might courts find it more difficult to hold the line in requiring plaintiffs to prove feasible
alternative designs in traditional, noncategorical litigation? For example, under current law,
when a plaintiff attempts to attack a Volkswagen's fragility by urging a midsized Ford as an
alternative, courts conclude as a matter of law that the suggested alternative is not feasible.
Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1076 (4th Cir. 1974) ("a microbus is
[not] . . . to be compared with a standard 1966 passenger type car"). But if courts began
allowing claims against product categories where feasible alternatives are not available, they
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C. Implications of Imposing Product-Category Liability
L Theoretical Policy Concerns
If courts somehow could overcome problems of implementation,
and if they were to impose liability on the basis of category-by-category
risk-utility balancing, then the same efficiency and fairness objectives out-
lined earlier in terms of across-the-board liability without defect would
be realized for product-category versions of liability without defect.165
For example, under risk-utility product-category liability, one would ex-
pect producers to invest in more care and consumers to consume at lower
levels than under our current liability system. 166 And once a product
was deemed to generate more social costs than benefits, a product-cate-
gory system would enhance fairness by adjusting costs between consum-
ers and producers and among different classes of consumers. 167
The more interesting policy questions arise in the context of select-
ing product categories on criteria other than risk-utility balancing. For
example, if courts were to choose to impose product-category liability on
the distributors of small handguns because they are controversial or be-
cause they are intended to kill people and human life is sacrosanct, one
could not be confident that singling out small handguns for extraordinary
treatment would further efficiency goals.168 Additionally, any criteria
used to determine if a handgun is "small" would be sufficiently arbitrary
to support claims of discrimination and unequal treatment before the
law,169 not to mention that singling out certain product categories on
might experience difficulty resisting the "V.Wi/midsized Ford" claim since feasibility would
no longer be required in all design cases. Once the requirement of feasible substitutability has
been compromised in categorical litigation, such compromise might erode the vigor and integ-
rity of traditional marginal product design review.
One might argue that jurisdictions that have adopted a consumer-expectations test al-
ready have undermined the role of alternative design, and that those jurisdictions do not need
product-category liablity to accomplish defect-free liability. By and large, however, manufac-
turers' decisions to reject extreme design changes are not the kinds of decisions that disappoint
consumer expectations. For example, a consumer who purchases a Volkswagen is fully cogni-
zant that she is not purchasing a large-sized automobile. Thus, if a court wishes to condemn
small-sized automobiles for their smallness, a consumer-expectations standard will not suffice.
What is required in that instance is product-category liability. See, e.g., Lovell v. Marion
Power Shovel Co., 909 F.2d 1088, 1091-92 (7th Cir. 1990) (concluding that despite decedent's
knowledge of machinery hazards, court must consider "the extent to which additional feasible
safety devices could have been added to make the product more safe").
16S See notes 41-51 and accompanying text supra.
166 See notes 41-46 and accompanying text supra.
167 See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
168 See text accompanying notes 172-90 infra. Whenever the courts tried to distinguish
between handguns that warrant and handguns that do not warrant strict liability, "second
best" problems undoubtedly would abound. See notes 105-06 and accompanying text supra.
169 In Gogol v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 595 F. Supp. 971 (D.N.J. 1984), the court noted
that Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984), which limited the
holding of Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982), to its
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what appear to be patently political grounds would constitute bad judi-
cial policy. 170
2. The Negative Distortion Effects of Product-Category Liability
In our earlier discussion of across-the-board liability without defect
we considered how markets were likely to react to the imposition of such
a liability standard. We argued that the adoption of such a sweeping,
unforgiving liability rule would encourage a wide range of evasive tactics
on the parts of business firms, designed to avoid paying the exorbitant
liability tax. 171 These evasive tactics, it will be recalled, present what
economists refer to as "second best" problems: targets of burdensome
governmental regulation, when possible, will seek to escape the burdens
by substituting unregulable (and in this context, possibly riskier) modes
of behavior. The results of such evasive behavior actually can make
things worse, rather than better. As we pointed out, these problems-
which we label "distortion effects"-can be quite serious. In contrast to
the analysis about to be undertaken, however, our earlier discussion of
the distortion effects of across-the-board liability had a decidedly hypo-
thetical tone. After all, no court has ever actually adopted across-the-
board liability, and we have amply demonstrated that to do so would
raise unresolvable implementation problems.172 Given that some courts
have actually adopted forms of product-category liability, at this junc-
ture distortion effects must be reckoned with in deadly earnest.
It will be recalled that even if a products liability system succeeds in
sending exactly the right liability signals to firms engaged in the produc-
tion and distribution of products, those firms may be able to deflect or
blunt the impact of those signals. Irrespective of whether the signals are
theoretically appropriate, these evasive responses will be attractive in di-
rect proportion to the intensity of the liability signals.173
Product categories singled out for "true" strict liability are likely to
facts, effectively held "that one rule applies to asbestos products, and a different rule applies to
non-asbestos products"; but the Gogol court declined to upset the Feldman rule on the equal
protection grounds advanced by the defendant. Gogol, 595 F. Supp. at 973-74; see also Mc-
Bride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1568-69 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (state cannot
single out products claims from other torts for limiting punitive damages).
170 See Epstein, Market and Regulatory Approaches to Medical Malpractice: The Virginia
Obstetrical No-Fault Statute, 74 Va. L. Rev. 1451, 1468 (1988) (criticizing Virginia statute for
choosing one class of serious birth-related injuries for legislative treatment and not others); see
also Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 64, 340 N.E.2d 444, 459, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 21
(1975) (" '[Elvery line drawn by a legislature leaves out some [products] that might well have
been included. That exercise of discretion, however, is a legislative, not a judicial function.'"
(quoting Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974))).
171 See text accompanying notes 93-97 supra.
172 See text accompanying notes 65-85 supra.
173 See note 89 supra.
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involve highly dangerous products incapable of being made safe for use
without destroying their inherent, categorical utility.174 As the prices of
these inherently and unavoidably dangerous products on normal com-
mercial markets rose dramatically to reflect the higher liability costs, ex-
treme forms of hit-and-run tactics would become increasingly attractive.
As in the days of Prohibition, black markets could be expected to
thrive. 175 Potential defendants could be expected to engage in patterns of
clandestine production and distribution designed to escape liability.1 76
Such responses not only frustrate the liability system's efforts to reduce
accident costs, 1 7 7 but their implementation, because they are nonproduc-
tive, wastes resources. 178 Legislatures, confronting such evasive tactics,
could be expected to enact regulations rendering the actions criminal or
at least assuring the actors' financial responsibility. 179 These legislative
174 See note 95 and accompanying text supra.
175 Prohibition involved laws and regulations aimed at the importation and distribution of
alcoholic beverages. Liability without defect would aim ultimately at the manufacturers of
products. Nonetheless, the basic problems presented would be the same-distributors would
have strong incentives to escape regulation.
176 For example, a 1977 study concluded that relatively modest state tax differentials on
cigarettes (ranging from 2 to 23 cents per package) created a serious problem of bootlegging to
avoid the cigarette tax, resulting in revenue losses to states amounting to $391 million per year.
According to one report, organized crime had become the largest wholesalers of cigarettes in
New York State. See Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations, Commission Re-
port: Cigarette Bootlegging-A State and Federal Responsibility 1-3, 21-25 (1987). In 1978
Congress enacted Pub. L. No. 95-575 which prohibited the transportation, receipt, shipment,
possession, distribution or purchase of more than 60,000 cigarettes not bearing the tax indicia
of the state in which the cigarettes are found. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2346 (1988). Although
the federal act has caused a dramatic decline in cigarette smuggling, the problem of bootleg-
ging remains a serious one. Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations, A Commis-
sion Report, Cigarette Tax Evasion: A Second Look 58-59 (1985). See generally Siliciano,
supra note 94.
We recognize that a price differential of up to 21 cents per package may be significant
enough to encourage bootlegging but not to promote undercapitalized manufacturing. We
profess no expertise on this matter; however, we are willing to predict that if the estimates of
$2-3 per package increases set forth above, see note 61 supra, are near accurate, black-
marketeering is inevitable.
Foreign importation and/or smuggling likely would become a serious concern as well. If
American cigarette manufacturers sold exclusively to foreign markets but their cigarettes were
imported clandestinely back into the United States, the question whether such importation
would constitute an intervening cause and exonerate manufacturers of liability to American
consumers becomes relevant. See Prosser & Keeton on Torts, supra note 15, § 44, at 305.
177 See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
178 See note 97 supra.
179 If courts adopted liability without defect, and clandestine producers began to supply
significant percentages of the relevant markets, legislatures would be tempted to try and
squelch such operations by rendering them illegal. If they took that step, the new system
would resemble the days of Prohibition. Cf. note 175 supra. The next step might very well be
legislation regulating the production and distribution of many products in much the same way
that insurance is regulated today. After all, under a regime of liability without defect, produ-
cers would be selling insurance as much as, or perhaps more than, they would be selling bever-
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and administrative responses, like the hit-and-run tactics against which
they are aimed, would represent nonproductive, wasteful allocations of
resources.
Once we posit the presence of unidentifiable or financially irrespon-
sible defendants we confront yet another undesirable distortion effect of
adopting defect-free product-category liability-a significant increase in
levels of production defects. Absent the worry about answering at all to
injured product users, hit-and-run operators would have little incentive
to invest in processes replete with optimum quality controls. 180 Thus, we
could expect an increase in injuries arising from, for example, contami-
nated tobacco or alcohol products.""1 These consumables would be more
likely to attract such illicit behavior than would durable goods since they
would require a smaller initial capital investment than automobiles, for
example.1 2
Meanwhile, with respect to durables, product-category liability
would encourage the retention and continued use of durable products for
longer periods of time. Commercial and noncommercial used product
markets would compete with commercial new product markets. More-
over, if courts applied product-category liability retroactively to prod-
ucts already consumed or in use when the new liability regime was
adopted, not only would society become more dangerous as used prod-
ucts increasingly substituted for new, but also the original manufacturers
and distributors of the aging products would face steadily increasing lia-
bilities for harm caused by those products.
Furthermore, because imposing liability on producers and distribu-
tors causes those costs to be borne by users and consumers on a per-
product basis rather than on a per-use or per-consumption basis, all
users pay the same liability premium upon purchase and thereafter are
free, without further monetary charge for accident costs, to use the prod-
uct as much or as little, and as carefully or carelessly, as they wish.1 83 As
a result, those individuals who contribute relatively lightly to the risks of
ages or cigarettes.
180 See note 103 supra.
181 See note 99 supra.
182 See note 102 supra.
183 Dean Calabresi refers to this problem as one of "insufficient subcategorization," See G.
Calabresi, supra note 41, at 246-49. Of course, to the extent that users are themselves at risk,
and face threats of not being able to recover due to their own fault, they are constrianed by tort
law. See generally Posner, supra note 44. But user fault is dealt with lightly by products
liability law. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment n (1965). And the state-
ment in the text is true regarding risks to third parties, on the assumption and to the extent
that negligence claims by third parties against users are unlikely to succeed. Moreover, these
caveats all relate to how carefully users use products and do not address the "how much use?"
question. Using products frequently is rarely tortious; there are no tort-based constraints on
how much a user uses a product.
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injury from product use and consumption subsidize those who contribute
heavily.1 84 Ideally, users would pay on a per-use or per-risk basis; 1 5 but
that is not possible under our current products liability system. 186
Although the current products liability system presents difficulties
in this regard, at least they are limited in that traditional law, in the
absence of a design or marketing defect, leaves product-related accident
costs where they fall. Proving that a product is defectively designed or
marketed is not an easy task. Thus, the substantial majority of individual
product users and consumers who cannot prove the existence of a defect
generally do bear accident costs roughly in proportion to their levels of
product usage and their contributions to the risks of injury.187 Conse-
quently, the distortion effect here identified is not so great under a defect-
based system. Adopting product-category liability would change this cir-
cumstance. Eliminating the requirement of defect for the product cate-
gories involved would shift all product-related accident costs to
producers and distributors of certain products.1 18 This subsidy would
encourage individuals to contribute relatively more heavily to product-
related risks, thereby wasting resources. In our earlier discussion of the
current, defect-based liability system we observed that these effects are
184 The point here is that the insurance pool associated with the sale and purchase of a
product is at one level, an involuntary pool. Less frequent, more careful users cannot escape
the pool once they decide to buy the product. See note 91 supra.
185 This system would achieve, in effect, the level of "subcategorization" that Calabresi
would deem optimal. See note 183 supra. Frequent users would pay premiums in direct pro-
portion to their frequency of use; less careful users would pay in proportion to their lack of
care.
186 Although theoretically possible, see Posner, supra note 44, at 211, as a practical matter,
products liability law tends to forgive the sins of private individuals and push most of the
liability onto commercial distributors. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A com-
ment n (1965).
Interestingly, consumable products do not present this problem under existing law be-
cause they more nearly reflect their liability costs on a per-use basis. Two kinds of liability
may fall on producers of consumables: (1) production or manufacturing defects and (2) fail-
ure to warn about less well-known risks. Injuries arising from these two sources tend to be
rare and rather idiosyncratic in nature. Most generic risks that inhere in consumables are
matters of "common knowledge" for which there is no liability under Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A comment i (1977) or are "unavoidably unsafe" and thus covered by comment k
of § 402A. Thus, because producers of these products are not liable, the cost of injuries falls
on consumers whose exposure to risk is on a per-use basis.
187 Since defectiveness is a prerequisite to recovery in the courts, the class of users and
consumers injured by nondefective products must absorb their net loss in physical well being,
and their treatment costs, in addition to other associated costs. In practice, however, few of
the individual members of the class actually bear the full costs.
188 Where liability is defect based, the cost of injury is roughly assignable to consumers on a
per-use basis. See note 186 supra. In the present discussion, having moved to defect-free lia-
bility where producers would be liable for injuries caused by "commonly known" and "un-
avoidably dangerous" products, we can no longer assume that injuries will be borne on a per-
use basis. As discussed in note 190 infra, occasional product users will pay for the injuries
suffered by product abusers.
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not very significant with respect to consumable products.' 8 9 Under de-
fect-free liability, consumables as well as durables would generate signifi-
cant levels of distortion.190
Finally, because fewer products would be subject to defect-free lia-
bility under the product-category regime, the effects of enhanced liability
would be concentrated on those products singled out. For example,
every accident involving alcohol would place liability on that product
even if others were more to blame. These financial pressures, coupled
with decreasing demand, black markets for new products, and noncom-
mercial markets for used products, would result in a death warrant for
any industry singled out for such treatment.
It follows that even if courts could somehow implement a system of
product-category liability, the drastic, prohibitionary qualities of that
system would cause market distortions of gigantic proportions. What
was theoretically interesting to note with respect to an across-the-board
no-defect liability scheme, becomes an acutely and practically essential
consideration for a product-category system of liability without defect
because of the latter system's seductive appearance of feasibility. But as
tempting as the judicial proscription of certain product categories may be
to some reformers, this section demonstrates that it is a temptation to
which our courts must not, and will not, succumb.
, D. Product-Category Liability in American Tort Law
While no court has purported to adopt across-the-board liability
without defect, 191 the situation with respect to judicial recognition of
product-category liability is quite different. Litigants have argued re-
peatedly in favor of product- category liability, 192 and several courts actu-
189 See note 186 supra.
190 One might think that consumables such as alcohol and cigarettes would carry their lia-
bility on a per-use basis. More frequent users would pay for their overconsumption because
each unit would reflect a liability tax. But that is not necessarily the case. Chronic abusers of
alcohol and cigarettes are likely to suffer health consequences that are more serious than occa-
sional users even when measured on a per-use basis. The occasional drinker, for example,
would rarely suffer injury, thus not tapping the liability system, but would help, out of propor-
tion to his own contribution to the risk, to pay for the injuries suffered by the alcoholic since
the cost of liquor would reflect all the costs attributed to the product.
191 Recall, however, that some courts have come close to doing so, even though their rheto-
ric belies the underlying reality. See text accompanying note 107 supra.
192 For cases involving firearms, see Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532,
1533 (1lth Cir. 1986); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1273 (5th Cir. 1985); Armijo v.
Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 773 (D.N.M. 1987), aff'd, 843 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1988);
Hilberg ex rel. Hilberg v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 761 P.2d 236, 240 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988);
Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 132 Ill. App. 3d 642, 649-51, 477 N.E.2d 1293,
1298-99 (1985); Knott v. Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 50 Wash. App. 267, 272-73, 748 P.2d
661, 663-64 (1988). For cases involving cigarettes, see Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 731
F. Supp. 50, 52 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 926 F.2d 1217 (lst Cir. 1990); Gianitsis v. American Brands,
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ally have adopted versions of it.193 Notwithstanding plaintiffs' repeated
and strenuous efforts to stake out this new judicial approach, however,
product-category liability is not now the governing law in any jurisdic-
tion. 194 In the few instances where plaintiffs have been successful, the
breaches have been quickly closed by legislative intervention. 195 Plain-
tiffs also have urged courts to broaden existing doctrine to accomplish
indirectly what they have refused to do directly. 196 For the most part,
these more subtle stratagems have not succeeded. This section investi-
gates both explicit and implicit product-category decisions to demon-
Inc., 685 F. Supp. 853, 855 (D.N.H. 1988); Miller v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 679
F. Supp. 485, 486 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988); Gunsaus v. Celotex Corp.,
674 F. Supp. 1149, 1159 (E.D. Pa. 1987). For a case involving minitrail bikes, see Baughn v.
Honda Motor Co., 107 Wash. 2d 127, 134-35, 727 P.2d 655, 660 (1986).
193 See, e.g., O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 185, 463 A.2d 298, 306 (1983)
(aboveground swimming pool with vinyl bottoms); text accompanying notes 197-202 infra. In
Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986), the court concluded that a
manufacturer can be held to a strict liability standard for a product that fails to meet risk-
utility norms because the dangers created by its use, even if unforeseen at the time of manufac-
ture, outweigh its utility. See id. at 114. But, if a product does meet risk-utility norms on its
own and is only defective because there exists an alternative design, the manufacturer is held to
a negligence-foreseeability standard. See id. at 115.
A third state appellate court may have imposed product-category liability on the theory
that the overall danger of the product outweighs its benefits. In Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 304
Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985), the court held that the manufacturers of "Saturday Night
Specials" could be held liable for injuries suffered by innocent third parties at the hands of
criminals. See id. at 136-37, 497 A.2d at 1148-49. Although earlier in the decision the court
rejected product-category liability based on risk-utility balancing, see id. at 138, 497 A.2d at
1149, the court's imposition of liability on manufacturers for injuries caused by cheap hand-
guns appears to condemn them because the overall utility of this genre of handgun to society is
too low tojustify their continued marketing. See id. at 155, 497 A.2d at 1158. Nonetheless, at
bottom Kelley is probably a case based primarily on a theory of negligent entrustment. See
text accompanying notes 260-62 infra.
194 Although state legislatures have nullified judicial adoption of product-category liability,
see note 195 infra, such nullification has limited application in at least one jurisdiction. In
Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 95, 577 A.2d 1239, 1252 (1990), the court
held that the New Jersey statute did not reflect the common law of the state prior to its enact-
ment. Thus, for cases filed prior to the enactment of the statute, a risk-utility case could be
established theoretically for products such as cigarettes. Since only six cigarette cases were
pending in New Jersey at the time the legislation was enacted, the decision of the court al-
lowing a risk-utility case to be made out when there is no alternative design available is only
relevant to a handful of cases.
195 See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.56(1) (West Supp. 1991) (overruling Halphen); Md.
Crim. Law Code Ann. art. 27 § 36-I (West Supp. 1990) (overruling Kelley); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 2A:58C-3(3) (West 1990) (overruling O'Brien).
Several states have passed somewhat narrower legislation that prohibits actions against
firearm manufacturers for injuries resulting from the weapon's inherent danger. These statutes
specifically allow for claims based on either defective manufacture or defective design (i.e., the
failure to institute an alternative design). See Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.4 (West 1985) (added by
Proposition 51, approved by electorate on June 3, 1986); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-501 (1986);
Idaho Code § 6-1410 (1987); Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-720 (1989); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.131(1)
(1987).
196 See text accompanying notes 239-59 infra.
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strate that all of the concerns described above are reinforced by actual
judicial resistance to this doctrine.
L Explicit Attempts to Establish Product-Category Liability
a Reliance on Risk-Utility Balancing to Establish the Relevant
Categories. The leading decision espousing product-category liability,
O'Brien v. Muskin Corp.,197 involved an outdoor, aboveground swim-
uing pool. The plaintiff dove head first into a shallow pool manufac-
tured by the defendant.198 As his outstretched hands hit the pool's
slippery vinyl bottom, they slid apart and caused him to strike his
head.199 A crucial issue in the case was the appropriateness of the slip-
pery vinyl pool liner and its contribution to the plaintiff's injury. The
trial judge took the design-defect issue from the jury because the plain-
tiff's expert admitted that he knew of no aboveground pool that used any
material other than vinyl as a liner and could suggest no economically
viable substitute.2°° On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed,
holding that even in the absence of a feasible alternative design the jury
was entitled to conclude that "the risk posed by the pool outweighed its
utility. ' 20 1 In short, the court held that triers of fact may impose liability
on product manufacturers even when the plaintiff fails to present any
evidence of an alternative design and the existing design meets the rea-
sonable expectations of consumers in general.20 2
Plaintiffs' lawyers were quick to realize that this new product-cate-
gory liability theory provided plausible, potentially devastating causes of
action in cases brought against manufacturers of inherently dangerous
products such as handguns, beverage alcohol, and cigarettes. If a prod-
uet that could not be shown to be defective on traditional grounds could
be declared unreasonably dangerous on the ground that the misery it
197 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983).
198 Id. at 178, 463 A.2d at 301.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 179-80, 463 A.2d at 304.
201 Id. at 185, 463 A.2d at 306. In elaborating on this theme, the court said:
The evaluation of the utility of a product also involves the relative need for that
product; some products are essentials, while others are luxuries. A product that fills a
critical need and can be designed in only one way should be viewed differently from a
luxury item. Still other products, including some for which no alternative exists, are so
dangerous and of such little use that under the risk-utility analysis, a manufacturer
would bear the cost of liability of harm to others. That cost might dissuade a manufac-
turer from placing the product on the market, even if the product has been made as
safely as possible. Indeed, plaintiff contends that above-ground pools with vinyl liners
are such products and that manufacturers who market those pools should bear the cost
of injuries they cause to foreseeable users.
Id. at 184, 463 A.2d at 306.
202 See id. at 198, 463 A.2d at 313-14 (Schreiber, J., concurring and dissenting).
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brings to society outweighs its benefits, then the multitude of plaintiffs
who suffer injury from these controversial products have a means of re-
covery even when traditional design defect and failure to warn cannot be
proved.
Many plaintiffs have asked the courts to adopt a theory of product-
category liability.20 3 Notwithstanding the plaintiff's success in O'Brien,
courts overwhelmingly have turned plaintiffs away as a matter of law,
offering a variety of reasons. Most of the reasons mirror both the policy
and implementation problems identified earlier in our discussion of the
theoretical and practical problems that would flow from the adoption of
product-category liability.20 4 Courts have said that risk-utility analysis
should not apply to products whose dangers are so commonly known
and which measure up to broad-based consumer expectations; 205 that it
would be extremely difficult to measure and monetize the psychic and
emotional pleasure of owning handguns or smoking cigarettes;206 that
product-category liability is a "radical doctrine which imprudently arro-
gates to the judicial process some very significant societal determina-
tions; ' '207 that courts would have no way of preventing inconsistent jury
verdicts for similar prodcuts; 208 that the test is so expansive that sellers
would face potential and unpredictable liability for almost any injury re-
lated to product use;209 that manufacturers would become insurers of
their products; 210 and that such highly political liability issues are best
left to the legislature.211
203 See cases cited in note 192 supra. In particular, extensive discussion appears in the
literature about categorically defective products. Several commentators have argued that risk-
utility analysis should be used to declare handguns defective. See, e.g., Turley, Manufacturers'
and Suppliers' Liability to Handgun Victims, 10 N. Ky. L. Rev. 41 (1982); Note, Manufactur-
ers' Liability to Victims of Handgun Crime: A Common Law Approach, 51 Fordham L. Rev.
771 (1983). But most commentators disagree. See, e.g., Santarelli & Calio, Turning the Gun
on Tort Law: Aiming at Courts to Take Products Liability to the Limit, 14 St. Mary's L.J.
471, 493-94 (1983); Note, supra note 155, at 1912-20; Note, Do Victims of Unlawful Handgun
Violence Have a Remedy Against Handgun Manufacturers?: An Overview and Analysis, 1985
U. Ill. L. Rev. 967, 981-83.
204 See notes 165-70 and accompanying text supra.
205 See, e.g., Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1984);
Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 773 (D.N.M. 1987), aff'd, 843 F.2d 406 (10th Cir.
1988); Mavilia v. Stoeger Indus., 574 F. Supp. 107, 109-10 (D. Mass. 1983); Baughn v. Honda
Motors Co., 107 Wash. 2d 127, 134-36, 727 P.2d 655, 660-61 (1986).
206 See, e.g., Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 731 F. Supp. 50, 53 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 926
F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1990); Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (N.D.
Tex. 1985).
207 See, e.g., Kotler, 731 F. Supp. at 53.
208 See, e.g., Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1274 n.68 (5th Cir. 1985).
209 See, e.g., Baughn, 107 Wash. 2d at 134, 727 P.2d at 660.
210 See, e.g., Patterson, 608 F. Supp. at 1213.
211 See, e.g., Kotler, 731 F. Supp. at 53; Patterson, 608 F. Supp. at 1216; Mavilia v. Stoeger
Indus., 574 F. Supp. 107, 111 (D. Mass. 1983); Hilberg v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 761 P.2d 236,
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Several courts have noted that the list of products that would be-
come subject to risk-utility attack is substantial. 212 Alcohol, cigarettes,
radar detectors, all-terrain vehicles, and high-speed automobiles are all
products that arguably score high on the misery scale, and yet most are
prominent fixtures in a free-market economy. 213 Given the wide range of
individual consumer behavior when making use of these products,214
judges understandably are loathe to place the onus for injury on the man-
ufacturer. Thus, one of the reasons that courts are hostile to the idea of
product-category liability may be that they intuit that the list of product
categories to which such an approach might apply is great and the impli-
cations for each product on the list enormous. Indeed, many judges ap-
pear to view the product-category liability derisively, describing it as
"radical" 215 and "delightfully nonsensical."2 16
As we noted earlier, state legislatures overruled all three judicial
adoptions of product-category liability.217 For example, in New Jersey,
the O'Brien jurisdiction,218 the legislature provided that whenever harm
allegedly is caused by a design defect, liability will not attach if there was
no "practical and technically feasible alternative design that would have
prevented the harm without substantially impairing the reasonably antic-
ipated or intended function of the product. '219 Although the legislature
created a narrow exception for products that are highly dangerous and
have almost no social utility,220 it is quite evident that product- category
241 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Rhodes v. R.G. Indus., 173 Ga. App. 51, 52, 325 S.E.2d 465, 467
(1984).
212 See, e.g., Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 773 (D.N.M. 1987), aff'd, 843 F.2d
406 (10th Cir. 1988); Patterson, 608 F. Supp. at 1212; Richardson v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d 751,
756 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
213 See Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1984) (sell-
ing handguns not ultrahazardous); Richardson, 741 S.W.2d at 758 (rejecting claim that 22-
calibre handgun exclusively for criminal use).
214 See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1269 (5th Cir. 1985); Gianitsis v. American
Brands, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 853, 856 (D.N.H. 1988); Gunsalus v. Celotex Corp., 674 F. Supp.
1149, 1158-59 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Note, Legal Limits of a Handgun Manufacturer's Liability for
the Criminal Acts of Third Persons, 49 Mo. L. Rev. 830, 846 (1984).
215 Kotler, 731 F. Supp. at 53.
216 Patterson, 608 F. Supp. at 1211.
217 See note 195 supra.
218 O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983); see notes 197-202 and
accompanying text supra.
219 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-3(a)(1) (West 1990).
220 Id. § 2A:58C-3(b) provides that to invoke the exception the court must make all of the
following determinations based on clear and convincing evidence:
(1) The product is egregiously unsafe or ultra-hazardous;
(2) The ordinary user or consumer of the product cannot reasonably be expected to
have knowledge of the product's risks, or the product poses a risk of serious injury
to persons other than the user or consumer; and
(3) The product has little or no usefulness.
Id.
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liability is a dead letter in New Jersey.221
b. Extending the "Ultrahazardous Activity" or "'Abnormally Dan-
gerous Activity" Doctrine. Another explicit stratagem utilized by claim-
ants to assert defect-free product-category liability asks judges to treat
the production and commercial sale of certain highly dangerous products
as abnormally dangerous activities upon which strict liability tradition-
ally has been imposed.222 Two factors distinguish this approach to strict
product-category liability from the approach described in the preceding
section. First, plaintiffs do not purport to rely on risk-utility balancing to
declare the product inappropriate for use and consumption. Thus, they
do not deprecate the overall benefits of the product to society, but claim
instead that regardless of these benefits the potential harm arising from
the product's use and consumption is so significant that sellers should be
made to bear the cost of that harm when it materializes. 223 Second, in
contrast to product-category liability based on risk-utility balancing,
which might leave the balancing to juries on a case-by-case basis, 224 the
task of deciding which activities fall under the "abnormally dangerous"
rubric is solely for judges to perform. 225 Consequently, if courts were to
221 Appended to the legislation is an official commentary by the New Jersey Senate Jud-
iciary Committee which indicates just how limited the exception was intended to be. The
commentary notes, "It is intended that such a finding [under the exception] would be made
only in genuinely extraordinary cases-for example, in the case of a deadly toy marketed for
use by young children, or of a product marketed for use in dangerous criminal activities." N.J.
Senate Judiciary Committee Statement, No. 2805-L.1977, cl. 197.
Clearly, almost all of the product categories discussed in the text would be covered by the
general requirement that an alternative design must be feasible if recovery is to be allowed. It
is difficult to see how a court could conclude that products such as handguns, alcoholic bever-
ages, or cigarettes have little or no usefulness to those who knowingly and willingly choose to
use and consume them. The examples set forth by the official commentary to the New Jersey
statute reinforce the exception's minimal practical meaning for products litigation.
222 See, e.g., Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1253-55 (5th Cir. 1985) (handguns);
Caveny v. Raven Arms Co., 665 F. Supp. 530, 532-34 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (same), aff'd, 849 F.2d
608 (6th Cir. 1988); Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 772-73 (D.N.M. 1987) (same),
aff'd, 843 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1988); Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 132 Ill. App.
3d 642, 644, 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1294 (1985) (same); Knott v. Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 50
Wash. App. 267, 272, 748 P.2d 661, 665 (1988) (same).
223 In almost all cases, plaintiffs have drawn the analogy to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts §§ 519-20 (1977), under which liability is imposed even though the activity was con-
ducted with the utmost care. See, e.g., Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1253; Caveny, 665 F. Supp. at 532;
Burkett v. Freedom Arms, Inc., 299 Or. 551, 554-55, 704 P.2d 118, 119-20 (1985). For a
discussion of Restatement §§ 519-20 as they relate to handguns, see Note, The Manufacture
and Distribution of Handguns as an Abnormally Dangerous Activity, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 369,
393-99 (1987).
224 See note 129 supra.
225 See Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 855, 861, 567 P.2d 218, 221 (1977) (en
bane) ("Whether an activity is abnormally dangerous is a question of law for the court to
decide."); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 comment 1 (1977) ("fw]hether the activity is an
abnormally dangerous one is to be determined by the court"). Judges have encountered con-
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adopt a theory of liability for abnormally dangerous products, they could
decide which categories or subcategories of products to bring within the
doctrine's ambit. Therefore, unlike the risk-utility product-category lia-
bility considered earlier, the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine runs
less risk of succumbing to jury lawlessness.
Given these important differences between the abnormally danger-
ous activity version of product-category liability and the version de-
scribed earlier, one might have expected judges to be more willing to
impose no-defect liability in the context of high-risk product categories.
However, courts have been equally resistant to utilize this more circum-
scribed method of establishing product-category liability. With the ex-
ception of a few cases that have suggested obliquely that the sale of a
dangerous product might trigger liability for abnormally dangerous ac-
tivity,226 the courts steadfastly have refused to recognize such a cause of
action. In cases involving handguns, plaintiffs have argued repeatedly
that the sale of these dangerous weapons qualifies for strict liability.227
In rejecting this application of the doctrine, some courts have noted that,
unlike the classic doctrine developed in the context of potentially danger-
ous use of land,228 the activity of the defendant was not land-based.229
Others have concluded that the widespread availability of handguns
siderable difficulty deciding which activities deserve to be considered abnormally dangerous.
Activities such as blasting, see Ward v. H.B. Zachry Constr. Co., 570 F.2d 892, 894-97 (10th
Cir. 1978); Laughon & Johnson, Inc. v. Burch, 222 Va. 200, 204-06, 278 S.E.2d 856, 857-59
(1981); storing explosives, see Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510, 512-13 (2d
Cir. 1931); and setting off fireworks in public streets, see Harris v. City of Findlay, 59 Ohio
App. 375, 377-78, 18 N.E.2d 413, 415-16 (1938), have been deemed abnormally dangerous and
subject to strict liability. At the same time, seemingly dangerous activities such as driving an
automobile, see Steffen v. McNaughton, 142 Wis. 49, 52, 124 N.W. 1016, 1017 (1910), or
engaging in building construction, see Gallin v. Poulou, 140 Cal. App. 2d 638, 640-42, 295
P.2d 958, 960-62 (1956), have been held subject to the normal negligence doctrine.
226 See, e.g., Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor ex rel. Wilson, 215 Ark. 630, 644, 222 S.W.2d
820, 827 (1949) (strict liability for sale of crop dusting chemicals); see also Barker v. Lull
Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430 n.10, 573 P.2d 443, 455 n.10, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 n.10
(1978) (somewhat delphic footnote suggesting potential for liability even absent safer alterna-
tive design); cf. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 517 F. Supp. 314, 318
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (strict liability for transportation of highly toxic chemicals).
227 See cases cited in note 222 supra.
228 See Fletcher v. Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865); In the Exchequer Chamber, 1 L.R. -
Ex. 265 (1866); In the House of Lords, 3 L.R. - H.L. 330 (1868). The Rylands doctrine has
had a long and checkered history in American jurisprudence. Suffice it to say that the vast
majority of American courts recognize that, for a narrow band of activities presenting risks of
serious harm even when conducted with the utmost of care, strict liability should attach. See 3
F. Harper, F. James & 0. Gray, The Law of Torts Ch. 14 (2d ed. 1986); Prosser & Keeton on
Torts, supra note 15, § 78.
229 See, e.g., Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532, 1534 (11th Cir. 1986);
Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1267 (5th Cir. 1985); Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 304 Md.
124, 133, 497 A.2d 1143, 1147 (1985); Richardson v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987).
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makes them commonly used products and thus not subject to the Re-
statement rule.230 Finally, many courts have noted the distinction be-
tween the use of handguns and their sale.231
This pattern of judicial denial is consistent with this Article's earlier
analysis of the implications of imposing product-category liability.232
When strict liability is placed directly on an activity that happens to in-
volve product use and consumption, each user and consumer can control
the risk levels of her activity. For example, if liability is placed on per-
sons who consume alcoholic beverages or on blasters who use dynamite,
each drinker or blaster, at least in theory, controls her own risk level.
Those who drink or blast in more dangerous contexts, or who do so less
carefully, will be exposed to correspondingly greater liability. In con-
trast, were liability shifted to distributors of alcoholic beverages or sticks
of dynamite, users and consumers would pay the same prices per unit of
product, regardless of their contexts of use or how carefully they be-
haved. That different blasters might bring different risk levels to the ac-
tivity of blasting would be of little moment under a regime of strict
manufacturer's-as contrasted with strict user's-liability. 233 The man-
ufacturer would have no practical method of distinguishing safe purchas-
ers from risky ones and setting prices for each accordingly. The results
would be significant moral-hazard problems; users and consumers would
face distorted incentives to take care because safer users would subsidize
the riskier.23 4
Commercial users of some high-risk products-in contrast to com-
merical distributors-are covered under the traditional "abnormally dan-
gerous" doctrine. 23 5 For example, dynamite blasting, widely regarded as
an ultrahazardous activity,23 6 is most often performed by commercial,
highly skilled experts who must insure against the risks of blasting. For
the most part, shifting liability away from dynamite users to dynamite
230 See, e.g., Caveny v. Raven Arms Co., 665 F. Supp. 530, 532 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd, 849
F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1988); Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 774 (D.N.M. 1987); see
also note 223 supra (discussing Restatement rule).
231 See, e.g., Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1984)
(distinguishing use of abnormally dangerous products from manufacture or sale of those prod-
ucts); Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758, 761 (D.C. 1989) (same), aff'd, 900 F.2d 368 (D.C.
Cir. 1990); Coulson v. DeAngelo, 493 So. 2d 98, 99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (per curiam)
(same); Burkett v. Freedom Arms, Inc., 299 Or. 551, 556-57, 704 P.2d 118, 121 (1985) (same).
232 See text accompanying notes 171-90 supra.
233 See notes 183-86 and accompanying text supra.
234 See notes 91, 184 and accompanying text supra.
235 See, e.g., Northglen v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 519 F. Supp. 515 (D. Colo. 1981) (service
station stored large amounts of gasoline underground near residential area); Luthringer v.
Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948) (fumigation using poisonous gases); Langan v.
Valicopters, Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 855, 567 P.2d 218 (1977) (crop dusting).
236 See, e.g., Ward v. H.B. Zachry Constr. Co., 570 F.2d 892, 895-96 (10th Cir. 1978) (ap-
plying Oklahoma law).
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distributors not only would distort care-taking incentives, but also would
do so for no good reason. The distributors of the high-risk products
would constitute redundant back-ups to already commercially viable de-
fendants. 237 Courts traditionally have made exceptions to their refusals
to impose categorical liability on product distributors when it is clear
that those distributors are in positions to manage the relevant risks in a
qualitatively superior fashion.238 Thus, commercial distributors of
highly dangerous items such as dynamite or liquor, while not generally
liable, may be liable in some cases for placing such products in the hands
of incompetents.
Three decades after the birth of strict products liability, the courts
have yet to declare high-risk products to be ultrahazardous or abnor-
mally dangerous. Although willing to impose almost absolute liability on
abnormally dangerous activities, courts have rejected outright the claims
of plaintiffs against manufacturers for harms caused by generically dan-
gerous products. The message is clear: applying ultrahazardous activity
liability in the fashion just described would do more than merely charge
the costs to the manufacturer, it would bar the product from all or a
significant sector of consumers. As with risk-utility product-category li-
ability, the courts will have none of it.
2. Implicit Attempts to Establish Product-Category Liability:
Categorical Liability Disguised in Traditional Doctrinal Garb
a. Stretching Failure-to-Warn Beyond Recognition. Failure-to-
warn products liability claims generally do not seek to impose liability on
product categories. More modest in their goals, failure-to-warn claims
usually target specific products and argue that the warnings that at-
tended their sale were marginally inadequate. 239 However, in at least
two major litigation categories, alcoholic beverages and cigarettes, prod-
uct-category liability claims frequently masquerade as failure-to-warn
claims. That is, claimants illegitimately utilize the traditional failure-to-
237 Presumably, the commerical users of dangerous products would be primarily liable to
injured plaintiffs. Thus, explosives manufacturers whose products are in no way defective
would be allowed rights of indemnification against commerical users of their products.
238 For example, courts generally recognize causes of action for negligent entrustment, see
authorities cited in note 261 infra. For an excellent review of authority dealing with the civil
liability of commercial sellers of liquor for the subsequent conduct of purchasers, see Ling v.
Jan's Liquors, 237 Kan. 629, 634-36, 703 P.2d 731, 735-36 (1985) (discussing trend toward
imposing liability on liquor sellers).
239 For a comprehensive discussion of the role of warnings in products liability, see Hender-
son & Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn,
65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 265, 271-80 (1990) (confusion in failure-to-warn cases often results in impo-
sition of excessive liability on manufacturers); Sales, The Duty to Warn and Instruct for Safe
Use in Strict Tort Liability, 13 St. Mary's L.J. 521, 527-55 (1982) (discussing basis and scope
of duty-to-warn action).
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warn action to hide their true agenda of imposing enormous liability
costs on, and perhaps thereby ridding the market of, certain categories of
products because those products do not meet the claimants' views of
overall social desirability.
Plaintiffs have made numerous attempts to sue manufacturers of al-
coholic beverages on the ground that they have failed to warn about the
dangers of addiction to their product. Traditionally, no court would
countenance such a claim.240 In a recent decision, however, an interme-
diate appellate court in Texas recognized a duty to warn consumers
about the health risks associated with massive, long-term overconsump-
tion of beverage alcohol.241 Although the Texas Supreme Court reversed
and held that knowledge of the dangers of alcoholism is widespread, 42
the intermediate court of appeals decision is a stark example of an at-
tempt to accomplish product-category liability by styling the cause of
action as a traditional failure-to-warn claim.
In the Texas litigation, the plaintiffs were chronic alcoholics who
sought damages from several distillers for "certain diseases, bodily in-
jury, financial ruin, mental anguish and loss of consortium caused by the
addictive drug, alcohol. 2 43 They alleged that the defendants failed to
communicate to consumers twenty-four separate items of information re-
lating to alcoholic beverages. 244 Notwithstanding the defendants' argu-
240 See, e.g., Garrison v. Heublein, Inc., 673 F.2d 189, 191-92 (7th Cir. 1982) (alcoholic
beverage manufacturer has no duty to warn of "generally known and recognized" danger);
Maguire v. Pabst Brewing Co., 387 N.W.2d 565, 570 (Iowa 1986) (same); Pemberton v. Amer-
ican Distilled Spirits Co., 664 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Tenn. 1984) (no duty to warn where danger is
apparent to ordinary user).
241 See McGuire v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 842, 852 (Tex. Ct. App.
1990) (requiring warnings since alcohol is dangerous beyond contemplation of ordinary con-
sumer), rev'd, 814 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1991). The authors helped write an amicus brief support-
ing reversal in the Texas high court.
242 See McGuire v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 814 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex. 1991).
243 McGuire, 790 S.W.2d at 845.
244 Id. The following items were listed:
(1) Continued use or excessive use of alcohol would cause cirrhosis of the liver; (2) Al-
cohol is a drug; (3) Alcohol is a depressant; (4) Alcohol causes diseases of the stomach
and duodenum; (5) Alcohol inhibits medical treatment; (6) Alcohol is toxic to the brain
cells and tissues; (7) Alcohol is toxic to tissues of the stomach, liver and heart;
(8) Drinking alcohol for pleasure or recreational purposes may lead to psychological
and physical dependency; (9) Alcohol compromises the immune system; (10) Some
people are genetically predisposed to alcoholism; (11) Psychological and social factors
may predispose a person to alcoholism; (12) Alcohol is harmful to health; (13) Over
two (2) drinks per day is harmful to health; (14) They failed to warn of the signs and
symptoms of alcoholism; (15) They failed to instruct on the symptoms of alcoholism;
(16) They failed to instruct on safe use of the drug; (17) They failed to warn that alco-
holism causes marital discord, family problems and financial problems; (18) They failed
to warn that alcoholism will deteriorate or destroy conjugal relations; (19) They failed
to warn that alcoholism is a lifetime disease and that recovery is impossible; (20) That
"denial" prohibits addicts from recognizing an addiction and receiving treatment;
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ment that the dangers of long-term overconsumption of alcohol were
well-known, the intermediate appellate court held that given the "vastly
increasing complexities in relationship between and among human be-
ings, (coupled with entire new fields of scientific knowledge and empiri-
cal wisdom)," there was reason to reexamine the law and to "implant
correlative duties. '245
Whatever else may be said for it, the case just described is not a
legitimate failure-to-warn case. Given the irrefutable fact of widespread
knowledge of the dangers of chronic alcohol abuse, a claim of inadequate
warning could proceed only if the court were willing to predicate liability
based on either: (1) the need for defendants to supply consumers with
highly specific information that generally is subsumed within broader
categories of risks well-known to society; or (2) the desirability of adding
tiny increments of information to the store of public knowledge. Many
of the allegations in the Texas beverage alcohol case called for specificity
that added nothing more than useless detail to what were generally un-
derstood risks.24 6 As numerous courts247 and commentators248 have
noted, detailed warnings that impart no new information are costly to
society.
That warnings should not be cluttered with needless detail seems
elementary. 249 However, what about the claims based on aspects of alco-
(21) That treatment of the addiction is very costly and beyond the economic means of
most alcohol addicts; (22) They failed to warn of the latent, hidden and concealed
hazards, defects and dangerous effects of the drug alcohol; (23) They failed to warn
Ronald McGuire's family and friends of the signs and symptoms of alcoholism;
(24) They failed to instruct Ronald McGuire, his family and friends to encourage him
to seek help at the first symptoms of alcoholism.
Id.
245 Id. at 852.
246 For example, the first allegation charged a failure to warn that "continued use or excess
use of alcohol would cause cirrhosis of the liver." See note 244 supra. If one asked intelligent
adults whether drinking in excess caused "cirrhosis," some percentage likely would not know
what "cirrhosis" means. But if one were to ask the same group whether drinking too much for
too long harms one's liver, few could feign ignorance.
247 See, e.g., Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 935, 937-39 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(discussing information costs); Kerr v. Koemm, 557 F. Supp. 283, 288 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(considering impracticability of providing warnings for well-known and obvious dangers);
Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 35 Cal. 3d 691, 701, 677 P.2d 1147, 1153, 200 Cal. Rptr. 870, 876
(1984) (discussing costs of overwarning); Dunn v. Lederle Labs., 121 Mich. App. 73, 81-83,
328 N.W.2d 576, 580-81 (1982) (arguing that excessive warnings on product labels may be
counterproductive).
248 See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, supra note 239, at 296-97 (warning of remote risks can
cause social costs that outweigh benefits of reduced accident costs); Schwartz & Driver, Warn-
ings in the Workplace: The Need for a Synthesis of Law and Communication Theory, 52 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 38, 58-60 (1983) (overwarning lessens overall effectiveness of warnings in
general).
249 See Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Prod-
ucts Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 Cornell L. Rev. 495, 513-17 (1976)
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holism that are less well known or more controversial? Consider, for
example, the contention that distillers should have warned that "some
people are genetically predisposed to alcoholism. '250 Many people prob-
ably are unaware of the possibility of biological predisposition to addic-
tion. Even so, the demand that it be included in the warning is
impractical. Opinions differ widely regarding what causes alcohol addic-
tion.251 If biological predisposition is to be the subject of a warning,
should not consumers also be told that many scientists believe that the
evidence to support the biological predisposition theory is inconclusive?
Moreover, if evidence suggests a strong correlation between chronic alco-
holism and cultural and social class characteristics,25 2 should this infor-
mation, although offensive to many, become part of the warning label?
As these examples show, one always can identify some tidbit of informa-
tion or detail of recent medical knowledge that a manufacturer might
have included. A cause of action that one can establish merely by claim-
ing that some tiny increment of information should be added to the prod-
uct label is virtually identical to product-category liability. In truth, the
product is faulted not because the warnings of its dangers are inadequate,
but rather because the product is controversial and deemed by some to
fail the overall risk-utility test for society.
Arguments supporting liability for failure-to-warn in cigarette litiga-
tion, though admittedly stronger than in the alcoholic beverages con-
text, 253 are fatally flawed for the same fundamental reasons. The amount
of information available to American consumers about the dangers of
smoking is, and for some while has been, staggering.254 The term "coffin
(discussing inverse correlation between number of product warnings and weight consumers
give to those warnings).
250 See note 244 supra.
251 Many believe that certain substances (including alcohol) are capable of addicting any-
one. See Schwartz, Views of Addiction and the Duty to Warn, 75 Va. L. Rev. 509, 558 (1989).
Others believe that biological predisposition plays a significant causative role. See Searles, The
Role of Genetics in the Pathogenesis of Alcoholism, 97 J. Abnormal Psychology 153, 158
(1988). Yet another view is that character traits play the predominant role in determining the
profile of the addict. See Schwartz, supra, at 531.
252 See Stanton, A Moral Vision of Addiction: How People's Values Determine Whether
They Become and Remain Addicts, 17 3. Drug Issues 187, 189-94 (1987).
253 The direct linkage of tobacco to cancer has become known only in the last half-century.
Thus, a failure-to-warn argument focusing on the disparity of knowledge between the tobacco
industry and consumers, at least in the early years of this century, is easier to formulate.
254 Over the years a huge antismoking literature of books, booklets, and pamphlets has
come into being. See, e.g., L. Coles, The Beauties and Deformities of Tobacco-Using (1851); S.
Goff, Petition to Congress: Prohibit Growing and Importation of Tobacco (1913); J. Griscom,
The Use of Tobacco, and the Evils (1868); C. Slocum, About Tobacco and Its Deleterious
Effects (1909); T. Taylor, Don't Smoke (1944); R. Walsh, The Burning Shame of America:
Outline Against Nicotine (1924). The Anti-Cigarette League, The Boys International Anti-
Cigarette League, The Non-Smokers Protective League of America, and The Women's Chris-
tian Temperance Union (WCTU) (each with numerous state chapters) all sought to end smok-
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nails," for example, dates back to the late 1800S. 255 Doctors regularly
warned patients that smoking was seriously deleterious to their health.256
National magazines regularly ran feature articles on the dangers of
smoking.257 The plain truth is that smoking has been the subject of in-
tense national controversy for at least the last half-century. To trans-
plant this raging debate into the courts for case-by-case resolution under
the failure-to-warn rubric hardly would foster the goals of traditional
products litigation.
Advocates of such litigation speak the language of abolition,258 and
even the more moderate reformers talk of increasing the price of ciga-
rettes to the point where they would be beyond the reach of ordinary
consumers.259 As with beverage alcohol failure-to-warn claims, plaintiffs
are seeking liability not for failing to provide adequate warnings but for
deciding to distribute inherently and unavoidably risky products in the
first instance.
b. Other Potential Avenues for Achieving Product-Category Liabil-
ity: Negligent Entrustment and Overpromotion. Two other traditional
bases of tort liability, negligent entrustment and overpromotion, have not
yet been stretched to the point of achieving the equivalent of product-
ing and published journals and periodicals to carry forward their message. See Corst &
Majoras, The "New" Wave in Smoking and Health Litigation-Is Anything Really So New?
54 Tenn. L. Rev. 551, 554-55 nn.18 & 24, 556 n.34 (1987).
By 1921, fifteen states had banned the production or sale of tobacco. However, by 1927,
these statutes were all repealed. The states were: Arkansas (enacted in 1907, repealed in
1921), Idaho (1921, 1921), Indiana (1905, 1909), Iowa (1896, 1921), Kansas (1917, 1927),
Minnesota (1909, 1913), Nebraska (1905, 1919), North Dakota (1895, 1925), Oklahoma (1901,
1915), South Dakota (1909, 1917), Tennessee (1897, 1921), Utah (1921, 1925), Washington
(1909, 1911), and Wisconsin (1905, 1915).
255 See 3 The Oxford English Dictionary 441 (2d ed. 1989).
256 See Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 300 (3d Cir. 1961).
257 See, e.g., Burke, Women Cigarette Fiends, The Ladies Home Journal, June, 1922, at
245-46; Does Tobacco Make One Tired?, The Literary Digest, April 15, 1922, at 27 (quoting
results of study comparing efficiency of heavy-smoking, light-smoking, and nonsmoking work-
ers); Hirshberg, Truth About Tobacco, Harper's Weekly, Jan. 4, 1913 (commenting on perva-
siveness of consumer awareness of claims linking smoking to cancer, heath disease, and
bronchitis). But see Whelan, Big Business v. Public Health: The Cigarette Dilemma, in
Drugs, Society and Behavior 87/88, at 91-97 (W. Rucker & M. Rucker eds. 1987) (arguing
that by use of economic pressure cigarette companies have discouraged all but handful of
American magazines from publishing articles dealing with health impact of cigarettes).
258 See Hearing before the Joint Comms. on Judiciary and Labor Relations on Products
Liability Issues, The House of Representatives of Pennsylvania, at 37-46 (Nov. 2, 1989) (state-
ment of Dr. Richard Daynard, Chairman, Tobacco Products Liability Project, Editor-In-
Chief, Tobacco Prods. Litig. Rep.) (expressing hope that imposition of liability would make it
financially impossible for minors to take up smoking). See generally Berger, A Sociological
View of the Antismoking Phenomenon, in Smoking and Society 225-40 (R. Tollison ed. 1986)
(discussing ideology of antismoking movement).
259 See note 61 supra.
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category liability. Given their potential in this regard, however, they de-
serve mention. Plaintiffs sometimes urge courts to impose liability on
product sellers not because the products never should have been sold to
anyone but because they should not have been sold to a particular class
of purchasers. 26° Typically, the plaintiff alleges that the buyer lacked the
competence to handle the product in a responsible fashion and that a
reasonable seller should have foreseen that placing the instrumentality in
the hands of the buyer would lead to injury. 261 In the leading case sug-
gesting a broad-based theory of negligent entrustment against a manufac-
turer, the court upheld a judgment against the entire distributional chain,
including the manufacturer, when an eleven year old fired a pellet from a
slingshot and caused his twelve-year-old playmate to lose the sight of an
eye.262 The decision fully explores the role of the court and jury in decid-
ing the legitimacy of such a claim and concludes that a jury might find
that marketing slingshots directly to children creates unacceptable risks.
In this case, the eleven-year-old perpetrator apparently purchased the
slingshot in a discount store off a sales rack. The court noted,
"[S]ingshots could be marketed [by the manufacturer] in a manner
designed to confine sale to adults and exclude purchase by children." 263
Negligent entrustment cases currently are so relatively rare and fact
sensitive that they do not implicate product-category liability.264 If,
260 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 comments a, b (1978) (discussing supplying
chattel to persons of class incompetent to use it); 5 F. Harper, F. James & 0. Gray, supra note
228, § 28.2 nn.23-25 ("[lit may be negligent.., to entrust some things to some classes of
people because of the likelihood that harm will ensue."); Prosser & Keeton on Torts, supra
note 15, at 197-203 (discussing negligent entrustment). Arguably, much of traditional design-
defect litigation smacks of negligent entrustment. At bottom, imposing liability for products
that could have been designed in a safer fashion reflects a judgment that users and consumers
cannot be trusted to act responsibly and that manufacturers must protect those users and third
parties from irresponsible product use and consumption. See, e.g., Auburn Mach. Works Co.
v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167, 1169 (Fla. 1979); Holm v. Sponco Mfg., 324 N.W.2d 207, 213
(Minn. 1982); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 379-80, 348 N.E.2d 571, 573-74, 384
N.Y.S.2d 115, 118-19 (1976). Nonetheless, the emphasis in traditional design claims is on the
manufacturer's failure to improve the product design, while in the classic negligent-entrust-
ment case the product per se is not put into question.
261 See, e.g., Jones v. Robbins, 289 So. 2d 104, 107 (La. 1974) (sale of gasoline to six-year-
old girl); Pair v. Blakly, 160 N.J. Super. 14, 17-18, 388 A.2d 1026, 1028-29 (sale of BB-gn to
minor), cert. denied, 77 N.J. 509, 391 A.2d 523 (1978); First Trust Co. v. Scheels Hardware &
Sports Shop, Inc., 429 N.W.2d 5, 8 (N.D. 1988) (sale of handgun to 15-year-old boy); Lake
Washington School Dist. No. 414 v. Schuck's Auto Supply, Inc., 26 Wash. App. 618, 621, 613
P.2d 561, 562-63 (1980) (sale of automotive flares to 13 year old who set them off and thereby
caused fire on school property).
262 See Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 432, 254 N.W.2d 759, 767 (1977).
263 Id. at 456, 254 N.W.2d at 773.
264 In Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 403 N.E.2d
440, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1980), a plaintiff injured on the job brought suit in negligent entrust-
ment against the manufacturer of machinery claiming that the manufacturer was aware that
the machine would be altered and put to use in a dangerous fashion. Id. at 475, 403 N.E.2d at
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however, courts were to utilize negligent entrustment broadly to impose
liability for marketing products to categories of users and consumers
deemed to be especially susceptible and if there were, in fact, no practical
method to market the products so as to exclude the susceptible class, a
very real threat of product-category liability would exist.
Courts also might impose the equivalent of product-category liabil-
ity by holding the commercial distributors of controversial products lia-
ble for having promoted their products too vigorously in the market. In
effect, the courts would recognize market failures when purchaser-con-
sumers are unable to reach rational decisions because of excessively se-
ductive advertising and sales promotions on the part of distributors.
Traditional representational bases of liability-misrepresentation of fact,
failure to warn, and breach of express warranty-would not be necessary
for recovery. Instead, courts would hold distributors of nondefective
products liable for having promoted their product too aggressively.
Although a few decisions over the years have explicitly relied on theories
of overpromotion to justify liability in the absence of traditionally defined
defect,265 and although several opinions in more recent alcohol and ciga-
rette litigation have referred disapprovingly to the methods by which dis-
tributors have promoted their harmful products, 266 American courts
generally have not recognized product overpromotion as an indirect
means of imposing product-category liability.267
444, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 721. In refusing to hold the defendant liable, the majority noted that a
manufacturer does not have a duty to design a product with safety features that will guarantee
against abuse by a particular purchaser. See id. at 475-76, 403 N.E.2d at 444-45, 426
N.Y.S.2d at 721-72. The dissent found ample grounds for imposing liability under the doc-
trine of negligent entrustment. See id. at 482, 403 N.E.2d at 446, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 723 (Fuchs-
berg, J., dissenting).
265 See, e.g., Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 54, 507 P.2d 653, 655, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 45, 48 (1973).
266 See, e.g., Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 835 F.2d 510, 514 n.4 (3d Cir. 1987) (maintaining
that appropriate standard looks to effects of advertising on individual as well as general pub-
lic); Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1491 (D.N.J. 1988) (holding that
jury might conclude that defendants, and cigarette industry in general, intentionally and will-
fully ignored known health consequences in advertising their products), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1386 (1991); McGuire v. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 84 S.W.2d 385, 388 n.5 ('ex. 1991) (noting "irony" that although
Seagram claimed it had no duty to warn because risk of alcoholism is well-known, it aggres-
sively advertised alcohol consumption as "particularly positive activity").
267 Aside from the reasons offered in the text, we believe that the overpromotion theory
raises a substantive issue which is extremely hard to litigate. At bottom, an overpromotion
case questions whether a manufacturer has presented a reasonably balanced picture of the
effectiveness, risks, and safety of the product. Admittedly, the manufacturer has presented the
raw data to the public, but the question is whether the total picture was fairly portrayed. In
the case of drugs, the costs of undervaluing the risks are significant. In general, however, the
question of what is a "reasonable advertisement" under the circumstances is highly polycentric
and raises serious justiciability problems. See authorities cited in notes 151-60 supra.
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CONCLUSION
Strong evidence indicates that American products liability law, both
conceptually and structurally, has reached its limits. Further develop-
ment is always possible in the form of marginal changes in existing ap-
proaches. Furthermore, we do not doubt that the unrealized future will
bring public health disasters like asbestos that will threaten to overwhelm
our tort system.268 But those developments will be factual in nature. Le-
gally and conceptually, the frontier of American products liability has
closed.
Reviewing the major breakthroughs of American products liability
law, one is struck by the courts' systematic elimination of conceptual
barriers to plaintiffs' recovery. First, courts eliminated the privity re-
quirement; then, the need in every instance to show fault; then, the neces-
sity of proving a production defect. Their next logical step would be to
eliminate the plaintiff's need to show any type of defect at all. Such a
move would be tantamount to imposing true strict liability for generic
product hazards, something that many courts claim rhetorically to have
done, but which none, in fact, yet has accomplished. Notwithstanding its
superficial attractiveness, however, across-the-board liability without de-
fect will never happen because it cannot happen.
In recent years, plaintiffs have urged courts to adopt what we refer
to as product-category liability-strict liability for producing and mar-
keting certain categories of risky products, such as handguns, cigarettes,
and alcoholic beverages, without regard to whether such products could
be designed or marketed more safely. In effect, the plaintiffs in these
cases seek to prohibit altogether the continued commercial distribution
of such products by holding producers liable for all the harm their prod-
ucts proximately cause. Both institutional and substantive considera-
tions strongly support rejection of product-category liability. Courts are
not suited to making the sorts of judgments required to be made. Consis-
tent with our analysis, most courts that have considered product-cate-
gory liability claims have rejected them out of hand. And of the very few
decisions that have embraced the notion, each has been reversed by its
respective state legislature. Most judges appear to have reached these
conclusions on their own. It may take time to educate the few who are
inclined to think otherwise. But we are confident that product-category
liability, with its abandonment of the traditional defect requirement, is
one significant step in the evolution of American products liability that
268 See McGovern, supra note 61, at 441-42 (current legal system inadequate to handle
mass torts); National Center For State Courts Judicial Administration Working Group On
Asbestos Litigation: Final Report With Recommendation 15 (1985) (traditional practice of
settling cases prior to protracted and costly litigation breaks down in mass tort cases).
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our courts never will take.
In concluding that courts will not accept product-category liability
because they are institutionally incapable of managing the litigation that
acceptance would invite, we have not yet addressed the underlying polit-
ical issues regarding whether any of these product categories ought to be
more stringently regulated by nonjudicial institutions, agencies, and mar-
kets. We note that these institutions are demonstrably more competent
than courts to reach the sorts of decisions called for in product-category
liability. Understand that we are not challenging the superior compe-
tency of courts to administer most of our existing products liability sys-
tem. Products liability is a necessary and appropriate response to market
failures, such as consumers' lack of adequate information about product-
related risks of injury.269
However, when one's attention shifts to the products most likely to
be deemed socially inappropriate under a system of product-category lia-
bility-handgtms, cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, and the like-it is fre-
quently difficult to see where the relevant markets have failed in any
ordinary sense of the term. Americans may smoke and drink too much;
but in substantial measure that is probably because many Americans who
do so prefer to engage in those activities knowing of the relevant risks.
Those who would prohibit outright or via a crushing liability tax the
routine commercial distribution of unavoidably unsafe products may be
reacting not so much to society's ignorance of the relevant risks as to
society's indifference to them.
Of course, to the extent that smoking and drinking generate exter-
nalities or involve addictive behavior, society confronts potentially signif-
icant market failure.270 In those instances, society sensibly may reach
collective decisions that this or that activity should be legally regulated-
perhaps even proscribed altogether-regardless of the existence of strong
consumer demand in the marketplace. But we find no reason to believe
that legislatures and administrative agencies are not up to the task of
making those decisions. As Lon Fuller, upon whose theoretical work we
rely, recognized, legislatures and regulatory agencies are designed, as
courts are not, to address polycentric planning tasks of the sort presented
by product-category liability analysis. 271 And the remedies that these
regulatory bodies can impose are infinitely more subtle than the "off-on"
toggle switch between dramatically high tort liability and practically no
269 For example, in a recent article critical of trends in failure-to-warn litigation, we reaf-
firmed the underlying good sense of recognizing such causes of action. See Henderson &
Twerski, supra note 239, at 312-13.
270 See notes 41-48 and accompanying text supra.
271 See Fuller, supra note 152, at 371.
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liability at all.272 The proscription of smoking during certain airplane
flights, 273 or in public spaces generally,274 are examples of more limited
ways that legislative or administrative regulation can approach the
problem.
The market, too, can adjust in subtle, incremental ways to affect the
relevant risks of injury. For example, a growing number of life and
health insurance companies extend more favorable rates to non-
smokers. 275 Similar flexibility is almost never available to courts consid-
ering whether to impose product-category liability.276 A "yes" decision
on liability would translate quickly and certainly into total proscription.
Taken together, these nonjudicial regulators are better equipped
than courts to respond to market failure relating to broad categories of
products. Unlike the situation concerning traditional design-based liabil-
ity, where governmental regulators could never hope to respond ade-
quately to the relevant risks presented marginally and incrementally, the
risks identified by product-category liability claims are highly visible and
relatively few in number. With respect to these risks, courts are not
needed even if they were institutionally capable of performing the neces-
sary regulatory tasks.
272 For example, a legislature or administrative agency concerned with the negative health
effects of certain widely consumed products may restrict the advertising efforts of producers,
see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1988) (making it unlawful to advertise cigarettes "on any medium
of electronic communication subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Commerce Commis-
sion"); Fla. Stat. ch. 561.42(10)-(12) (1989) (restricting distribution and display of promotional
items for alcoholic beverages); Okla. Stat. tit. 37, § 516 (1981) (unlawful to advertise alcoholic
beverages except at retail liquor stores); or require warnings to accompany distribution. See 15
U.S.C. § 1333 (1988) (requiring Surgeon General's warning conspicuously located on packs of
cigarettes for domestic sale); 27 U.S.C. § 215 (1988) (mandating Surgeon General's warning on
alcoholic beverages for sale in United States).
273 See 49 U.S.C.A. § 1374 (West Supp. 1990) (banning smoking on domestic flights sched-
uled for less than six hours).
274 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-601.01 (1986) (smoking prohibited in elevators,
theaters, libraries, art museums, lecture or concert halls, buses, school buildings, and certain
areas of health care institutions); Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 25940-25949.8 (West Supp.
1990) (declaring tobacco smoke a hazard and restricting smoking in publicly owned buildings,
health facilities, and restaurants); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 1399-n-x (McKinney 1990) (smok-
ing prohibited or heavily restricted in private and public schools, hospitals, public buildings,
theaters, retail stores, arenas, and public transportation systems).
275 See J. Athearn, F. Pritchett & J. Schmit, Risk and Insurance 351 (6th ed. 1989).
276 See notes 272-74 and accompanying text supra.
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